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INTRODUCT ION
In the broadest sense of the word every politically

organized socIety has a ConstItution which, wrItten or unwritten, determines the political agencies which shall exist and the
powers which shall be assigned to them.

From 1789 to 1871,

France was a field of constItutIonal experiments perhaps unique
to the world.

The variety of political regimes that she inau-

gurated in the course of these years is not found in the history
of another people.

The eIght constitutIons which were promul-

gated succeeded one another wIth such discerning. rapIdity that
the people had scarcely time to become acqUainted with them.
In fact, it would be necessary to count the transformations

many of them underwent in their brief existence.
The first constitution, that of 1791, which had been
legally established was overthrown in a short time by the insurrection of August 10, 1792.

In the following month of Sep-

tember, the Republic was proclaimed and the First Republican
Constitution of 1'193 was declared.

Although 1t was never en-

forced, it 1s numbered among the constitutions beoause those
who composed it governed Franoe for the next two years.

The

seoond Republioan Constitution, or the Constitution of the Year
III, beoame the offioial rule of Franoe from 1795 until the

i

..
accession of Napoleon in 1799.

11

He drew up the Constitut1on of

the Year VIII and proclaimed it the official organ of government
in France until he abdicated in 1814.

The fourth political

regime took root in Franoe through the Restoration Constitution
granted by Louis XVIII.

This reign, however, was interrupted

for a short period by the re-establishment of Napoleon I and was
finally overthrown by the insurreotion of 1830.

Next the Con-

stitution of 1830 was established by Louis Philippe and remained
in foroe until the Seoond Republio was proolaimed by the Revolution of 1848.

This government had scaroely exeroised its

authority when it was over-thrown by the ooup

d'~

of 1851.

Through this action, Napoleon III assumed power until the revolution of 1870.
A superfioial observer may oonolude that Franoe underwent more frequent and radioal ohanges during these years than
in any previous oentury.

In a sense this is true:

the outward

form of government was overturned repeatedly; monarohy gave way
to republio and vioe versa.

These new forms of government also

brought important ohanges in the organization and exercise of
legislative power in addition to the transformed exeoutive.
However, if publio law is oonsidered from a juristio pOint of
view the pioture of Franoe is very different.

Governments oame

and went very muoh as ministers oome and go now, but all that is

iii
oharaoteristic of French public law either reaches back into
the old regime or is the product of the Revolution and the
empire.
The Constitution of 1791 derives its chief interest
from the drastic changes it proposed for the political reorganization of the French nation.

The France of the old regime

was an ancient edifice which fifty generations had been building
for more than fifteen centuries.

As time went on the great con-

flict of ideas and interests, the tragic class of forceful personalities, the international struggles produced a structure
whose parts lacked proportion and threatened to fall into rUin.
Conditions in France warranted the belief that some fundamental
changes were imperative.

The nation was in a most important

crisis; and the great question whether France should inaugurate
a Consti tuti on or, continue to be goverlled by will was uppermost
in every mind and heart in France.

This review will show that

the Constitution of 1791 was promulgated to check the tendency
on the part of the French king to centralization through the
introduction of three distinct branches of government--the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

This does not imply

that a centralized government is not good, for such a government,
when it is well managed and carefully watohed from above, may
reach a degree of efficiency and quickness of action which a

iv

•
gov.ernment of local powers cannot hope to equal.

But if a

strong central government becomes disorganized, if inefficiency
or idleness, or above all dishonesty, once obtain a ruling place
in it, the whole governing body is diseased.

•
CHAFfER I

PRELIMINARY

CONSTITUTIO~AL

PROCEEDINGS

If one were to examIne the governments of Europe in

the eighteenth oentury, and the polloies whloh they followed or
attempted to tollow, he would tind that everywhere oontrol was
ln the hands of the few and dlreoted to the advantage ot the
tew.

The ldea that the flrst duty of the state was to assure

the welfare ot the people was not actually practiced.

On

the

contrary, the duty ot the state had become a duty of pleasing
the rulers and the privIleged classes.

Europe was organized

monarchlcally and aristocratioally, and for the beneflt of
monarohs and aristooraoies.

There was a widespread feelIng that

revolutions were impending, and this feellng became a reallty in
Prance whioh was, politioally, highly organized, and strongly
1

centralized in 1789.

In a letter to Marquis de la Luzerne,

Gouverneur Morris glves the following impression of Franoe in
the year 1789:
France seems to be in a state
whioh oannot fail eventually
to produoe dissent ions in prlvate
circles. The seeds are already

1

James Thompson The Frenoh Revolution.
Press, New York,-r§45, 198
1

Oxford University

2

sown; and you (who have lived in a
Republio) know how quiokly plants
vegetate ••• Republioanism is absolutely
a moral influenza from whioh neither
Titles, Plaoes, nor even the Diadem
oan guard their possessor. If when
the States assemble their Debates
should be published t~e Lord preserve
us from a hot summer.
He also informs Count de Maustier, the Frenoh Minister to the
United States, that "your nobles, your olergy, your people are
all in motions for the eleotions.

A Spirit whioh has lain dor-

mant for Generations starts up and stares about ignorant of the
means of obtaining, but ardently desirous to possess its
3
object."

In order to understand the nature and depth of this
politioal and sooial unrest whioh existed in Franoe, it 1s necssary to know something of the polit10al organization and
ooial structure whioh the French Revolution aimed to change.
In France, the orown had always been the symbol of national

nity and power.

During the period in whioh the nation, under

he deft guidance of Riohelieu and Mazarin, achieved supremaoy
1n Europe, royal authority became absolute in Franoe.

During

Ann Cary Morris (editor) The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur
Morris. I Charles ScrIbner's Sons, New York, 1888, xi
fb1d., i11

3
<tI

the reign of Lou1s XIV (1643 .. 1715) the Frenoh Monarohy achieved
1ts final form, and d1d not vary from that time until the out4

break of the revolution.

Fervid as were the French in their

loyalty to the K1ng, they were not willing to become subjeots to
lawless caprice.

They striotly adhered to the prinoiple formu-

lated by Montesqu1eu between a despotism which has fear as its
guiding prInciple, and a monarohy whioh has honor as its rule
of conduot.

The despotic oontrol whioh Louis XVI exeroised

over Franoe gradually deoreased as the organization and management of the government 1noreased.

Therefore, on the eve of the

revolution, the true center of power resided not in the hands
of Louis XVI but in a Royal Counoil oomposed of more than forty
members.

This was probably the worst evil from whioh Franoe

suffered since the members of this oouncil pretended to serve
the sovereign and the people; but their rewards were determined
by intrigue and favor and were entirely disproportionate to
5

their services.
other serious ev11s of the anoient regime were the
6

unfair taxes suoh as the ta11le, and the gabelle, and the

4

Franq01s Mignet The French Revolution. (Vol. X of The
H1story of Nat1onS"idlted by Henry
Lodge) The H.-' Snow
and Son ~mpany, Ghioago, 1907, 3
5 Edward Lowell The Eve of the French Revolution.
Houghton, M1ffiInanacOmpany, Boston, 1892, 11-13
6 Taille, a heavy property tax; gabelle, salt tax

c.

4
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profligate method of oolleoting known as .. farming," the numerous and oonflloting legal systems in the oountry, the internal
oustom lines, the "lettres de oaohet" (arbitrary arrest), the
sale of offioes, the money payments to the judges, the slow and
'.

expensive legal procedure, torture, oruel penalties, and the
feudal dues owed to the lord.

However, it would be a mistake to

conolude that the revolution was caused by the worst conditions
of tyranny and oppression, for the people of Franoe were not the
"I

most oppressed people of Europe.

There must be a spirit to

resist, and usually the most determined resistanoe oomes from
those who,have seoured at least a degree of liberty, and the
Frenoh enjoyed a greater degree of liberty than almost any other
people an the oontinent.

Tbe resistanoe oame from the growing

middle olass who desired a share in the government, and by
arousing a vigorous publio opinion in favor of reform, they
8

would make their aspiratiOns a reality.
Remedies were suggested in the form of limiting the
arbitrary power of the government by a oonstltutlon whioh would
bestow on an assembly of representatives great power.

"I
8

This

George Andrews The Constitution in the Earl! Frenoh Revolution. F. S. cro1'ts a~d Company, liiw-rork, 1 27, 1-2

~., 4

-

r
5

assembly would make laws and sanction taxation; abolish privilegeS and abuses; and establish equality before the law.

The

three orders of French society which had been reduced to a state
of political nullity by the Royalty now assumed new life and
vigor for the revolutionary step meant the reformation of
9

France.

The nobles in 1789 had lost all that had made them

respected; and preserved all that made them despised; their
privileges appeared as a unique favor conferred on some individual.

They were tired of being merely courtiers; the higher

clergy desired additonal influence; the commoners demanded a
recognition of their existence.

The nation impatiently compar-

ed the government of England, where talent could rise to anything, with that of France where one was nothing except by birth
or favor.

Thus all thought and action turned equally to the
10
same end--Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.
Therefore, there was universal rejoicing in France
when. the convocation of the State General was announced because
no one remembered a time when the government had consulted the
people and they felt such a time would not corne again.

For 175

years the assembly had not convened and during that period no

9

Fred M. Fling Source Problems on the French Revolution.
Harper and Brothers, New York, ~1~8
10 E. L. Higgins (editor) The French Revolution. Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston,~38, 3

6

•
writs had been issued and no eleotions had been held. The old

institutions were worn out and oould no longer work without
irritating the people.

Sooiety had beoome oramped by the des-

potio anarohy under whioh it had struggled. The States General
gave hope of a oonstltutlon, and this word opened the door to
every kind of supposition and afforded a temporary satisfaction
11
to every aspiration.
Talleyrand states a "heavenly day" dawned for the
opening of the Assembly.

Morris desoribes the high dignitaries

of Church and State in their brilliant robes of office in striking contrast to the members of the third estate olad in their
gloomy black surtouts.

However, they oarried themselves proudly

in this attire for they had achieved the desire of being onoe
12
again reunited at Versailles.
From that day on, the struggle
began between the privileged and the unprivileged, between
absolute and representative government, between the old and the
;

new regime.

All of France was in a state of contradictory and

oonfused agitation.

A state of oonfidenoe and fear, joy and

rage existed throughout the nation.
Before and after the decision to summon the States

11
12

Louis Madelin The Frenoh Revolution.
London, 1916, 3-4
MorriS, 70

William Heinemann,

7

•

General, a great deal was said and written about a constitution.
Count Fersen, a Swedish nobleman at the court, characterized
13
the universal talk about a constitution as a "delirium. 1t
Those who imagined that France possessed a submerged constitution that mIght be extracted from her annals had a difficult
task.

Lanjuinais desired to direct the politics of 1789 by a
14
charter of the year 864.
Others maintained that France had

a constitution which was not written, but rested upon the tradition that the monarch was hereditary and his authority abso15
lute.
Kitchin, on the other hand, states -that the solid
foundations of constitutional life, in the hearts of a people
sharing in power, interested in public affairs, responsible for
16
the direction of opinion, had never been laid in France.1t
Consequently, out of the welter- of opinion, two views emerged.
One group maintained that the country was either without a constItution, or if one existed, it was so vicious, that it was not
worth preserving.

13
14

15
16

In either case, an entirely new instrument

Andrews, 2
John E. Acton Lectures on the French Revolution. (edited
by John F!ggis) Macmillan-and Company, tondon, 1916, 103
Faustin Helie Les constitutions de la France.
Edouard Duchemin;-Paris, 1880, 3 -- -George ·W. Kitchin History of France. I I I The Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1803, 361

8

was necessary.

The other claimed that France already had a

constitut1on which had been violated or ignored.

The existing

conditlon, they sald, merely required the restoration of the
17
ancient constitution with the elimination of abuses.
When the States General were opened by the K1ng at
Versailles on May 5, 1789, there were about 1,200 deputies, of
whom about 300 represented the clergy, 300 the nob1lity, and
18
the other 600 the third estate.
It was evident that the
common people had been affected greatly by the assembly; and
the quest10n of moment was the form to be taken by the States
General, since 1ts solut1on would decide whether political
supremacy should rest with the nobles and clergy or with the
third estate.

The three orders met in separate chambers, but

when the formation of a single chamber was rumored the nobles
and clergy urged vote "by order;" the third estate, desiring to
19
have a precedent in their favor, demanded vote -by head."
Since the assembly bad not met since 1614, there was great doubt
and difficulty as to the r1ght course to follow.

No one exactly

17 Andrews, 2-4
18 Bertha Gardiner The French Revolution. Longmans, Green,
and Company, New York, 1918, 306
19 Leopold G. Legg (editor) Select Documents Illustrative
of the H1sto~ of the Frenoh ReVOlution. I Tbe Olarendon
Press, OXl'or , 1'908,9

9

•
knew what the States General was or how it was composed.

Eng-

lIshmen who chanced to be in France were eagerly questioned;
20
old documents were looked into but no solution resulted.
The
questIon of the double representation for the third estate and
the vote by head, instead of by order, divided France into two
hostile camps.

They were discussed in the press with bItterness

and the important topic was always what attItude would the government take.
Louis XVI, who had summoned the States General, beoause of oircumstances he was unable to control, again showed
himself incapable of leading the natIon in the crisis at hand.
He regarded the convocation of the States General ohiefly, If
not altogether, as a great finanoial experIment;

"8

machine by

which he might grapple with the hourly growing defICit, and
21
lIghten the unbearable burden of the debt."
His message to
the assembly was short and full of unexoeptional sentiments
and a fatherly regard for his people, but there was not a word
about the topio nearest the representatives' hearts--constitutional reform.

He had conceded to the assembly to bring happi-

ness to the people and prosperIty to the state.

The final de-

cisIon of the organization was left to Louis XVI, but the king

20
21

Henry Morse Stephens A HIstory of the French Revolution.
I Longmans, Green, and company,-Wew-!ork, le97, §
Kltohln, 495

r-.

,

..
bad neIther the statesmanshIp to see what the crisis

10

dema~qed

nor the decisIon to carry out what more able advisers suggested.
For government to be effective, the public authorities must act
1n harmony; this c.ondItion was lacking in the states General.
When Louis refused to deolare himself against the
privIleged orders, the ineVitable consequenoe at onoe ensued.
Negotiations proved fruitless and dispute arose as to the torm
~f

government to be adopted.

The third estate refused to pro-

ceed with the business until they were jOined by the other two.

22

They did not spare their words in seeking to arouse publio opinIon against the upper

olass~

Although there had been no direot

collision between the crown and the representatives of the third
estate, the long inefficienoy of the king had destroyed belief
in the royal power as an instrument of government.

Yet they

were deeply attached to the monarchy as a form of government
and thoroughly loyal to the person of the king.
Louis XVI oonfirmed the rumor

~hat

Therefore, when

they were to meet as 'three

separate states, the third estate took matters into their own
hands and deolared themselves the National Assembly of France.

23

Having been shut out of the regular meeting place by government
troops, they went to a neighboring indoor tennis court on June 20

22
23

Fling, 10-11
Ceoil Headlam
1833, 340-341

France.

Adam and Charles Blook, London,

11
•

where they took the famous oath never to separate until they had
given a oonstitution to Franoe.

A majority of the olergy and a

minority of the nobles joined the third estate.

Finally at the

urgent request of the King, who feared an insurreotion, the remainder of the nobles and olergy jOined the oommons on June 27,
1789.

Thus the third estate triumPhed in the union of the orders

This reunited body oalled itself the National Constitutional
Assembly--an assembly representative of the wbole nation whose
24

funotion was to enaot a oonstitution.
If the old oonstitutlons of Franoe had perished, there

still remained the old elements of sooiety--the nobles, the
olergy, and the third estate who had freely expressed their
opinions in the oahiers whioh, it is sald, amounted to fifty or
sixty thousands.

There were letters in whioh the people embod-

ied their grievanoes and desires; however, in none was a republio
demanded, nor even a ohallenge to dynasty; nor did they even indirectly oriticize the King's ,oonduot.

In all these documents,

the Frenoh were imbued with an ardent royalism and a warm devo25
tion to Louis XVI.
In fact, none of the petitioners attributed their stated grievances to the monarchy nor even to the king.

24

25

Fortun~ Benvenuti

Eaisodes of the French Revolution.
Simpkin, Marshall an Company, London, 1880, 27
Fran~ois Aulard
Histoire po11t1que de la revolution
francaise. I L1bra1rie A.lOo11n, Parls;-190i, 80-81
9

12

•
In the documents of the more humble petit10ns from the
there was a note of conf1dence l love, and gratitude.

par1shes~

Those of

the nobles and clergYI though less enthusi a st1c I appeared equally loyal.

Their complaints read that "the King's agents had de-

ceived the King" or that "the agents hampered his power of doing
26

good."

Malouet descr1bes the cahiers as the true depos1tory

of the opinions and des1res of France; bowever l certain other
historians as Babeau l LoutcheskYI and Wahl have regarded them
27

as flnoisy clamor."

This might be explained by the fact that

man is always d1scontent with the government which rules himl
and if several millions were called upon to express their compla1nts l they certainly would complain.
The cah1ers were consc1entiously studied by the King
and his ministers.

The clergy started an investigation of their

letters l and the commons summarized the opinions of their gri"evances on the single subject of a constitution.

The cahiers

revealed with clearness a middle class visualizing a reform
program and the deep discontent of the work1ng class.

They

showed a mode of life where abuse was borne with patience and a
lack of resentment.

26

27

According to these letters l deep divisions

Charles Chassin Les elections et les cahiers de Paris.
I Jouaust et SigaUi; ParisI 1888 1 ~
Madelinl 43

~'

,

13-14

.
between class and class existed; yet there was no class war.
All the orders of society demanded greater freedom from restriction and a larger voice in the government.

28

They demanded

in general that France should not cease to be a monarchical
government; that the King should remain sacred and law should
not pass without his sanction.

On the other hand, they desired

that the States General be invested with legislative power.
Conoerning the distinction of orders, dissention was absolute.
The cah1ers of the third estate desired the termination of the
division of orders; those of the nobles, with few exceptions,
demanded the continuance of the division of orders.
were divided.

The clergy

On matters of general interest, they desired

~

vote by head; an matters of interest to each class, they wished
29
,
a vote by order.
In a report to the assembly on July 27, 1789,
Clermont-Tonnerre summarized the cahiers aocording to prinoiples
30
of unanimous agreement and partial argument.
The people felt
they could never be rid of these evils unless a constItution was
Inaugurated, and thus the program of 1789 which was to give
France a constitution went into effect.

28

Prosper S. de Hauranne. Histoire du gouvernement
iarlementaire en France. I Michel Levy Freres, Paris,

29
30

Higgins, 4
Appendix I and I I

85'7, 21-23

-
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As soon as the fusion of the Orders had been effected,
the assembly undertook its work of forming the constItution.
This was a task of transforming into a limited monarchy by a
paper constitution a state which had never known anything else
31
but absolutism.
The task seemed light for the spirit of the
majority was confident to excess.

"The constItution is perhaps

the work of a day, because it is the result of the enlightenment
of an age,· said Barere.

Every member of the assembly felt that

they were all legislators and that they had come to amend the
wrongs of the past, and to assure the future happiness of the
32
In reality the bUsiness of framing a oonstiFrenoh Nation.
tut10n proved very arduous.
A committee was selected on July 6, 1789 to draw up a

plan of procedure for framing the constItution.

The following

eight men were chosen--Mounier, Talleyrand, Sleyes, Clermont-"
Tonnerre, Lally-Tollendal, Champion de Ciroe, Bergasse, and
Chapelier.

Mounier was chosen as the spokesman for the com-

mittee not only because he was a firm believer in the superiorlty of the English system of government and a successful leader
,

in the uprising ln the Dauphine, but because of his firm

John Abbott The French Revolution of 1789. I Harper and
Brothers, New-VOrk, 1887, 141
-- ---32 The cambri~e Modern Historl. VIII The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1 04, 176
31

16
33

character and uncontested honesty.

In his introductory re-

marks, Mounier explained that sInce the Crown had suffered in
the past trom faithless ministers and privileged groups, a constitution which should precisely determine the rights ot the
monarch and the r1ghts ot the nation would be as useful to the
34

King as to the subjects.

He explaIned that no political

system could evade the problem of authority.

The prIncipal aim

of any constitution, even of the most democratic, is to produce
a government which shall govern, which shall possess real InitIatIve and command.

At the same tIme, however, it must dis-

ciplIne itself to obey, within certain limits, the ministry
35

which created it.

All government, whether it is a monarchy,

absolute or limited, oligarchy or republic, draws its power
from the consent ot the nation, and thus can claim that it
36
emanates from the nation.
The princIples of 1789 were based on the idea that the
nation is sovereign and that all its members are tree and possess
equal rights.

After Mounier had established the rIght and duty

of the Assembly, he Indicated that two principles should inspire

33
34
35

36

de Hauranne, 36
Andrews, 12
William L. Middleton The French Political System
Ernest Be.nn Limited, London, 1932, 46
Paul Viollet Histoire des instItutions politiques et
administrative de la France. I t. Larose et 'orcel~Parls,

1890, 1

--

~~~--------------~
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and dominate the new oonstltutian--the prinoiple of monarohy
and the prinoiple of representation.

These two princIples must

organize the oonstitution and build up around it
whioh would make it live.

institutions

From th1s startIng pOint, the polit-

ioal oonstitution was drawn up dominated by the rule of the sep37
aration of powers, exeoutive, legislative, and judioial.
The
assembly deolared to establish:
1. The natural rights of man
2. The prinoiples of monarchy
3. The rIghts of the nation,
the rights of the King,
the rights of the oitizens
under the Frenoh government.
4. The organization and funotion
of the NatIonal Assembly
5. The organization and funotion
of the provinoial assemblies
and munioipa11ties.
6. The prin01ples, obligations,
and limits of judicial power.
7. The funotions and duties of
military power. 38
Mounier proposed to begin with a Deolaration of the
Rights of Man.

On

August 1, the Assembly began to disouss these

drafts; but slnoe Franoe was without a government and Frenoh
sooiety was in dissolution, Mlrabeau adv1sed the adjournment of
the drafts until the oonstitution had been finished.

However,

the assembly oontinued the dlsoussion until August 27 when the

37

38
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39
last olause was passed.

The deputies of 1789 believed that

all the misgovernment and publio ills were due to a failure to
reoognize the rIghts of man.

When the oharter of rights was

aooepted, a new doubt arose.

If the oitizen received rights

then to obtain a greater peaoe, should he not also be presented
40
with a oatechism of duties?'
The deputies said nothing but
let the1r oreed stand for what it was--a grand entrance to the
oonstitution.
Evolution in government had made rapid strides in
Franoe from the opening of the Assembly on May 6 until the
adoption of the Deolaration of the Rights of oMan on August 2?
Louis XVI had dismissed Neoker, the finanoial minister, from
offioe on July 11 without any future plan of aotion.

On July

14, the fall of the BastIlle indioated the fall of the old
monarohy; therefore, Louis had no ohoice but to yield to all
that was demanded of him.

Now the nation was ready to adopt

its first written constitution based on the Deolaration of the
Rights of Man.

The events whioh had taken plaoe made it more

urgent and indispensable that they abolish the institutions
41
which have injured equality and rights.

39 !h! cambrid~e Modern Historl, 1?7-l78
40 Thompson, 9
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First and foremost in the constitution, the principle
of the separation of powers was applied with the utmost critical
42
stringency. In the preamble,
the essence of the constitution,
they state that the national sovereignty is exercised by representation through an assembly (the legIslature), the King (the
executive), and by delegation through a court of justice (the
judicial).

Thus the age-long monarchy was abolished.

The

assembly seems to have thought that the executive had been and
would always be the enemy of the legIslature.

Though they cared

little for Montesquieu, they were fascinated by his doctrine
that the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial
puwers one from another is the primary condition in the func43

tioning of political liberty.

They declared in the Declara-

tion of the RIghts of Man that Uevery society in wh1ch the sep44 .
aration £! powers 1s not determined has no Const1tut1on. u
Although a universal opinion for a constItutional and representative monarchy had been reached, the organization of this monarchy brought forth two distinct vIews.
Abbe sieyes, the spokesman for the third order, suggested that the constitution should consult reason and set up
a scientific machine whose perfection would ensure an efficient

42
43
44
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and lasting government.

This would serve as an example to the

other nations of the world.

The other sohool of thought, led

by Mounier, Lally-Tollendal, Bergasse, Clermont-Tonnere, and
Malouet thought that a oonstitution was not a meohanioal and
logioal work, but work whioh should oonsult experienoe more
than reason.

They pOinted to the example of England where a

real oonstitution approved by long praotioe had realized for
the people--11berty; therefore, would it be wise to rejeot this
45
established one, and seek a better imaginary one.
They knew
that they oould not transplant the oonstitution into Franoe,
but proposed to make it their model and modify it to oonform to
the oustoms and habits of Franoe.,
Although the two sohools were in agreement ooncerning
the divisions of powers, they dld not interpret this separation in the same manner.

For the first school, whioh is known

as the abstraot sohool, the separation of powers meant an
absolute and vigorous limitation of the funotions and duties
of each of the three departments of government.

Thus a barrier

would be ereoted whioh would prevent the meeting of the different powers.

It a confliot arose, it oould not be settled by the

departments of the government.

This sohool tried to point out

to Sieyes and his disoiples that so rigorous a separation was

45

de Hauranne, 43-45

21

•

more practical in their heads than on paper.

To all the ob-

jections, Sieyes responded that society ought to be organized
on the model of the human body---the head thInks; the arm acts
and executes, and one never encroaches on the functIon of the
other.-

Thus In society, the legIslative power 1s the head;

the executive power is the arm; It would be absurd to mix them.
However, Sleyes and hIs followers forgot that in the human body,
the head and arms are part of a wlique being so organized that
the head cannot execute its wishes without the arms, nor can the
46
arms refuse to obey the head.
The men of the EnglIsh school had not fallen into suoh
errors; they wished to dIvide the power, but still each department would be able to aid, to control, and to moderate one another reolprooally.

They knew that a oonstitutional monarohy

should be one of disoussion, transaction, and balanoe; and their
good sense refused to admit the oonsequenoes of an absolute sep47
aration of powers.
It would be diffioult to olassify into one school or
the other the majorIty of the citIzens of the Frenoh nation.
When it was a questIon of proclaiming the principle of national
sovereignty, of instItuting and guaranteeIng public lIbertIes,

46
47
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of substituting inequality for the injustices of the old regime,

the deputies desired a constitution founded on reason.

On the

delicate question of the distribution and organizatIon of power,
their ideas were confused and often contradictory; however, sincE
they desired a constitutional monarohy more than anything else
they favored the plan of Mounier and his friends.

48

Until 1789 all the power had been concentrated in the
person of the King; nevertheless, when the idea of three distinct powers was introduced into the assembly, it did not meet
any objection since the political ideals of Montesquieu were
well known in France.

The citizens knew very little about

public affairs; therefore, when they found in books a formula
which seemed to solve the1r difficult1es, they took it for absolute truth.
of Montesquieu.

Such was the case with the political philosophy

49 .

He conceived the separation of powers as the

fIrst condition of po11t1cal liberty.
ideals of government are set forth in

Montesquieu's political

!a! Spirit

~

!h! ~

where he asserts the general proposition that the Constitution

•

most in conformity with nature is that whioh is best suited to

48
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the character ot the nation tor which It is intended.

He be-

lieved that the salvation of France depended upon the possibility of undoing the work of Richelieu and LouIs XIV and ot returning to the old monarchy as it existed under Henry IV or
Louis XII.

He would temper monarchy by aristocratic institu-

tIons, since he was convinced that all individual sovereignty
was bad--whether in the hands ot one or many it would lead to
50
despotism and despotism to anarchy.
Theretore, he prepared
to prevent individual sovereignty trom becoming despotism, Din
order that there may not be an abuse of power, power must check
power.-

All France desired would be now lost it the new Con-

stitution gave to the same man, or the same body ot nobles, or
51
to the people the exercise of all three powers.
ThIs desire
to limit the power of the sovereign distinguished Montesquieu
from almost all political theorists ot his age.

He held that

monarchies perish ·when obedience becomes servile, when honor
is no more, when the nobles are the despised instruments of the
Prince, when the dishonorable and base are honored; when the
monarch, abolishing all institutions and bodies intermediate
between himself and his people, seeks to centralize all government in himself."

Such was the condition of France under Louis

50 The cambrld!e Modern History, 18-19
51 BrJssaud, 5 7
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XVI.

He wanted the ConstitutIon

o~

the old monarohy, if it

existed, lito be rebuilt and enlarged on the plan
and Amerioan Constitutions. 1I

o~

the British

That 1s that a check be placed on

the arbItrary power of the government.

52

St111 stranger was the influence Rousseau exerted over
the Assembly.

In the Contract Soclal, the B1ble of the Assembly,

he set forth an absolutely and rigid and impraoticable ideal.
"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains i • are the opening words of the Contract Soc1al. He ma1ntained that man makes
a contract by which he agrees to live in SOCiety.

He assumed

that man 11ved first In a state of nature and that he escaped
from th1s state through the soc1al contract.

By this he means

that man surrendered his rights to a community and promised to
obey the sovereign to whom it would give those rights.

He de-

sired the majorIty to scorn experience, to treat men as though
they were all equivalent quantities, to mold and remold French
53
society through the will of the leg1s1ator.
The Constitut10n
of 1191 was not and could not be conformable to Rousseau's
maxims, but it was Imbued with his spirIt.
Among a mass of less memorable wrItings of the cahiers
were a few of solid composition that left a mark on the policy
and opInion of the assembly.

52

53

The most outstanding of these 1s
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the famous "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?"

54

of Abbe S1eyes.

He

asked and answered his own question--"What is the Third estate,"
he asked.

"It 1s everything," he answered, "but hitherto the

States General counted little.

The third estate, as Sieyes had

so often sa1d, was the "nation minus the nobles."

It embraced

almost all France, and it was neither a cast nor a political
body.

At one extreme, 1t touched the nobles, and at the other

it plunged into the popular masses; and it was among these ranks
that the ideas and the theories penetrated into legislation and
renewed the face of French government.

Sieyes was convinced

that in h1S solitary meditations he had discovered the absolute
55

truth.

Sieyes separated himself from Montesqu1eu by his love

of equality and hatred of privilege; from Rousseau by his respect for individual liberty and by his taste for a representative system.

However, the arguments Sieyes presented for the

defense of the third estate were logical under the present ciroumstanoes; the deputies oould give no retort.

The Assembly

then undertook its most arduous work--the reformation of the
orown.

54
55
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CHAPrER II
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER
Since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, the idea that
sovere1gnty resides in the multitude, has been a truism of
scholastic philosophy.

It rests on the observation of the fact

that 1n society the multitude will have the last word; if it
is necessary to resort to force, as in battle, v1otory will go
1

to the greatest warriors.

In the small cIt1es of the anc1ent

world, the citIzens assembled and used their primitIve method
of ostracism to remove opponents from office.

But in the

history of the great State of France, there was nothing to
I

warrant the view that sovereignty resided in the people.
"
The ancient regime
was an absolute reign pushed to
the extreme.

When Louis XVI ascended the throne in 1774, he

inherited a power nearly absolute in theory over his entire
kingdom.

Royalty was a power born In Itselr.

It was a power-

in the eighteenth century which was synonomous wIth the King of
France.

By its origin and Its nature, it was essentially in-

defInIte, inflexible, capable of drawing away from, or adopting
itself to the most dIverse situations.

Royalty had its initial

appearance at the close of the tenth century as a weak puny

1 Brissaud, 537
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faotor in society, and little by little, it had elevated itself
until it could olaim the title of

~

grand rOi.at the end of

2

seven centuries.

Although it had survived all the obstacles

which fell across its path and had oonquered the feudal soo 1ety,
it died suddenly at the end of the eighteenth century.
It was a recognized maxim that royal will was law.
The king concentrated in himself all sovereign authority and all
power.

He united the military and judicial powers, the legisla-

tive and administrative powers, so that he exercised direct and
3

despotic power over the nation.

In certain parts of the coun-

try, the old assemblies still met at fixed times but their functions were very closely lim1ted.

The Parliaments, or high

oourts of justice, which had claimed the right to impose some
check on legislation had become the puppets of Louis XIV, and
the principal one at Paris had been dissolved by Louis

xv.

Therefore, the royal prerogative of Louis XVI was theoretically
whole and complete since every organ of the government was auxiliary to the crown and operative only within the discretion of
the King.

4

In no part of the country was he a stranger,.for his

name was inscribed at the head of all local sovereign acts as
the name of a superior to whom they owed certain marks of deference.
2
3
4
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The King's oouncils had inoreased to five and were
truly the central governing power, although they did nothing in
their own name.

The King nominally settled every question with

their advioe, but the final deoision rested with Louis XVI.
Every important matter was subm1tted to him.

Thus in the gov-

ernment of the oountry, the K1ng could at any moment take as
much a burden upon his own shoulders as they were strong enough
5

to bear.

These counoils had not been formed, as in England,

by d1vision of duties but had become teohnical boards with a
distant relation to the administration.
Still the French people looked hopefully to the king
for government and the neoessary measures of reform.

Louis XVI

was well meaning and anxious to rule; he was willing to work
bard at bis royal duties in order to br1ng freedom to his
people; his intentions were always good and his sense of duty
6

strong •

However, they longed for a fair d1stribution of public

burdens, rather than for a share in the government.

Eaoh con-

stitution formed did not limit his powers; did not impose any
rules on his actions; did not give to his subjects the rights
they desired.

5
6

The government was more rigid than absolute; it
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was intangible for those who lived under it.

•
A King of France

wbo had reigned justly and· strongly would have received the
moral support of the most respectable part of his subjects; but
Louis XVI was devoid of all greatness of character; there was a
want of dignity about him which made it hard for him to rule:
be was timid where he should have been bold, irresolute and weak
7
where he should have been strong.
This characteristIc possibly
accounts for the failure of his administration.

Even at his

deatb those who had lived under his despotic rule thought him
honest and well-intentioned, but unequal to the situation in
wbich he was placed.

8

Every monaroh 1s surrounded by many

barriers which he must overcome, but Louis XVI had become so
imbued with the aristocratic not1ons of his ancestors, so incensed by the prest1ge of his name, that he did not foresee the
time when uncontrolled kings govern1ng with unlimited authority
9

was at an end.
When the monarchy became oonscious that reforms were
needed, and abuses had accumulated which required solving, it
was incapable of introduoing these reforms.

7
8
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adapt itself to the new st'andard, a new force arose--public
opinion.

However, 1n this setting of despotism and aristocracy

how could the idea of a political system which gave to the
assembly the power of legislation, and placed the executive
power in the agents of the King penetrate the mind of one who
bad exercised the three functions of government through his
10
royal will.
Nevertheless, the attitude of the government of
1789 was liberal and certainly loyal to the King.

Even as late

as January 24, 1791, the government issued a set of proclamations to prove that the sovereign was Uthe good king his subjects desired him to be.

"His majesty," they said, "has assem-

bled the States General ••• to preserve in regard to them the
character which lies nearest to his heart--that of counsellor
11
and friend. II
The word fI friend" must have touched the country
deeply.

This declaration might have been issued to strengthen

the words of Louis XVI in the preamble to the letters of this
convocation.
We have need of the meeting of our faithful
subjects to aid us • • • in establishing
according to our wishes, a constant and invariable rule in all the branches of the
government which concern the happiness of
our subjects and the prosperity of our realm. 12

10
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At this time however, were the essential elements necessary to
form this new society present in the French government?

Louis

XVI, brought up in the rich ancestry of absolutism, would regard this representative government as a hindrance to the
Imate prerogatives which he held from his ancestors.

leg1t~

To him,

it seemed a great harm to the nobility on whom he was accustomed
to lean.

That Louis XVI was master and his will made the law
13
was universally accepted by all the nation.
The admiration of
the English Constitution was still rather theoretic than practical, and would not detract from the·loyalty undoubtedly felt for
the French crown.
The King was supposed to be absolute.

Yet, the rep-

/

resentatives of the old regime made light of the declamations
against the "despotism of the King."

He was really the "chief

slave" of a system of which he probably disapproved, but was
powerless to modify.

He was the official chief, but also the

slave of his court, of his minIstry, of tradition; and his de14
sire for li~erty was greater than that of his subjects.
If he
were a reformer in intention, the majority of his actions did
not substantiate this belief.

When Lally-Tollendal established

the fact that the king should be an integral part of the

13
14
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legislature, not only because it resulted from French tradition,
but because it conformed to the nature of things, what chaos
15
must have existed in the mind of Louis XVI.
The royal government impatient with the abuses of the administration hurled itself from a powerless orystalized regime to a revolutionary
16
one.
It ooncluded that a total destruction must precede a
complete reconstruction; therefore, under the new foroe of publio
opinion, divine right sovereignty disappeared from the government
of France.

The division and multiplication of powers substitut-

ed for the ooncentration of powers, and the regime of 1791 became, therefore," a violent antithesis of the old order.
After the insurrections of July in Paris and in the
Provinces, and the fall of the Bastille, royal authority went to
pieces.

With it, according to Caryle, went afeudalism, despot17
ism, ••• and all hard usage of man by his brother man. a
These
insurrections were open violent rebellion of freed anarohy
18
The old administrative system ended
against hated authority.
and many new municipalities were created.

These same uprisings

showed that no trust could be placed in the regular army, and

15 de Ha uranne, 6
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•
innumerable militia, devoted to the cause of the Revolution,
19
appeared.
The rising of the peasants, the burning of manor-

houses and manorial records led directly to the memorable decrees of August 4, when the feudal tenures and the privileges
of orders, cities, and provinces were virtually abolished.

The

feudal courts of justice were swept away; and the royal Courts
20
of Justice were extinguished without any effort.
All ancient
historic divisions of France gave way to a new system of departments, d 1stricts, and cantons.

The c onf iscat ion of Church

lands destroyed the wealth of the clergy, and the "civil const i21
tution"
caused a schism among their numbers. A wide and general destruction of the old institutions was made by the Assembly.
timid.

It met little resistance as its adversaries were weak and
Society seemed to dissolve itself in order to receive
22

an entirely new pattern from the Assembly.

The moral effect

of these measures was most salutary for those who "deplored the
horrors committed in the name of lIberty" and volunteers rose
,

in large numbers to defend the royalty of the ancien regime.

19
20
21
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and 6th, the King and the Assembly were advised to leave Versailles and go to Paris, for they feared Louls XVI was again
y1elding to the influenoes at the oourt whioh were hostl1e to
reform.

Here at Paris the revolutionists oould keep hlm under

watoh; the oity was not only suspioious but also tendend toward
v101enoe and brutality.

It was then that the foroes were aooum-

ulated whioh produoed the Constitution and made Franoe a repub26

lio.
To understand the oourse of debates and exeoutl.e
deorees that resulted in the short-lived oonstitution of 1791,
it is neoessary tQ oonsider some of the partles in the Assembly.
They appeared during the debates over the Constitutlonal question as to whether or not the king oould veto the aots of the
Assembly.

Their names resulted from their position ln the

Assembly hall in relation to the president.

The Rlght, led by

Mounier, was oomposed of those who favored the oonstitutional
monarchy of England.

The Center party were praotically neutral,

and voted as they were influenced by publio expresslon of discontent.

The Left was the most aotive division of the Assembly.

It included many young nobles, the most noted of whom were

...

Slayas, Talleyrand; and La Fayette.

26
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sever themselves from the past, but at the same time to maintain
27
the monarchy.
There was one man in the Assembly, although he did not
claim membersh1p in any of the parties, Who saw the state of
France as it actually existed.

This was M1rabeau who will be

remembered for what he attempted rather than what he accomplished in the first years of the Revolution.

Although he was sus-

pected by all parties, he was recognized for his OPpos1t1on to
absolutism, and his ability as a writer on political subjects.
;

He was bitterly opposed to the old regime, but saw that Franoe
was incapable of a republican government, and, consequently,
28

urged a change to constitutional monarchy.

He was unable to

w1n over LaFayette and his followers to his plan in spite of his
influenoe in the Assembly.

As the revolution progressed and the

Left seemed to gain viotory, the stronger did Mirabeau's desire
beoome to restore Louis XVI to the favor of France.

He urged

Louis XVI to win baok the oonfidenoe of the nation by separating
29

himself from the upper order.

Mirabeau wished that the King

should have a veto power over the aots of the Assembly, but the
people dreaded the oontinuanoe of absolutism and determined to

27
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weaken the power of the executive.

Mirabeau did not trust the

wisdom of collective bodies, or the polltioal intelligenoe of
tbe middle classes; therefore, he supported the King as

th~

guide and leader of France.

The Assembly would not sanction any

real power in the executive.

Many were opposed to Mirabeauj and

in order to be completely independent of royal influence during
the formation of the constitution, the Assembly voted that no
deputy should be allowed to receive office from the King.

This

aimed directly at Mirabeau, as the rumor had spread that Mirabeau
was seeking a place in the parliamentary ministry.

Although he

urged Louis to repeal this measure, his efforts were in vain and
the principle was embodied 'in the constitution. Monarchy had
30
been destroyed by the deputies.
They sald the maxim of separation of powers kept the chiefs of the exeoutive from the legis lature.
The remodeling of the administrative system began with
the sovereign.

From the examinatIon of the oahlers, there were

definite questions concerning the authority of the king which
31
Since the Assembly had deolared itself
needed a solution.
inseparable from the person of the King by moving from Versailles

30
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.
to parls, it was almost as mUoh a prisoner as the King.

The

oonstitution preserved the heredltary monarohy but set limits
to the power of the King in aooordanoe with the formula of the
separation of powers of Montesquieu.
fonotionaire publio.
-premier
power itself, but is now the

It deslgnates the King as

He is no longer the exeoutive
ohief person to exeoute orders

given to him by the oonstitution.

In the parliament, in the

clubs, in the newspapers, and even in the diotionary the word

!2!

was abandoned, and in its plaoe had been substituted pouvoir

exeoutif.

Now he reigned in virtue of heredity, but not in the
32
name of the law.
All that he stood for was lost to publio
worship when he oeased to oommand reverenoe and obedienoe.

Tbe

Assembly was inexperienoed in the art of politios; and in excluding royalty from oonst1tutional power, it plaoed LOUis XVI
1n a subordinate situation, and took from oourt its glory in
the anoient regime.

Therefore, agreement between the King and

the Assembly, which was always desired but not always managed
33

wisely, beoame very diffioult.
The powers and rights of the king as enumerated 1n the
constitut1on made him a mere honorary clerk isolated in his

32
33

Legg, 321-322
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34
palace.

If

•
the nation did not have the right to remove him,

there were cases in which he was considered as having abdicated.
For example, in the spring of 1790, Louis XVI had ordered some
of the French fleet to the territory of Nootka Sound 1n North
Amerioa to help settle the dispute between England and Franoe
over the region.

Spain claimed the help of France under the

Family Compact, and this claim was acknowledged by Louis XVI
and his ministers.

He hoped the Assembly would support him be-

cause of the anoient enmity against England; however, his hopes
were in vain, for the Assembly, disregarding the immed1ate need,
deoided that if treaties were acts of sovereign power, then no
treaty could be valid without the expressed oonsent of the
people.

Since none of the treaties of France had reoeived ex35
pressed oonsent of the people, none of them could be binding.

Mirabeau urged that the King should still have the power of declaring war and peace, but the Assembly favored the proposal
which placed this power 1n the hands of the Legis lature.

The

Assembly gave a new proof of 1ts resolution to keep foreign
affairs 1n its own charge when it cancelled the permission given

34 APpendix IV
35 H. Morse Stephens (editor) The Statesmen and Orators of
the French Revolution. I Clarendon Press;-Oxford, l8~,
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•
by the Ministers to Austrian troops to pass through France to

Belgium.

Spain became distrustful of France and made terms with

Great Britain yielding all the points they had disputed.

The

weakness of the French crown was now as powerful in foreign
affairs as in domestic affairs.

The Assembly acknowledged the

nation liable for the King1s debts as they feared the emergencies of foreign affairs would enable it to regain some of its
36
power and dignity.
The constitution gave to the King the exercise of the
executive power, and a very limited share of the legislative
power.

He appointed ambassadors and negotiated with foreign

nations, but these negotiations were subject to the ratification
37

of the legislative body.

He was supreme head of the army, but

he could appoint only the superior military commanders and could·
give no orders to the National Guard.

He was likewise the high-

est authority in the administrative system, but the appointment
of administrative and judicial officers did not belong to him.
In

38

reality, the King was merely the person to whom royal author-

ity had been delegated hereditarily; he could be truly styled
King of the French people by the grace of God and the constitutional law of the state.

The crown was indivisible and trans-

36 The Cambridge Modern History, 190
37 APPend!x IV
38 Br1ssaud, 550-551
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m1tted through the male line aooording to the law of primogeni39
His ministers, seleoted outside the assembly, were only
ture.
admitted to 1t for the purpose of giving information and answering questions.

All secondary and looal author1ties--judges,

administrators of departments and distriots, mayors and mun1c1pal officers--all, from the greatest to the least were elected.
The K1ng stood for the exeoutive power, but he had no executive
agents.

Every order of the K1ng had to be counter-signed by a

min1ster, and the ministers were respons1ble, while the K1ng
was irresponsible.

40

Gouverneur Morris visited the Assembly on

November 20, 1790 while the const1tution was being made and expresses h1s opinion of it thus:

"The Almighty Himself could not

make it work unless He created a new species of man.

Lafayette

is assailed by doubts.

M1rabeau declared that the disorganiza41
t10n of the kingdom could not have been better planned."
In spite of the King's submissive behavior, as he had

shown no opposition to any measures adopted by the A,ssembly, the
executive was still looked upon as an enemy. He still appeared
too formidable; therefore, in order to prevent h1m from taking

39
40
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.
action, he was rendered suspect.

Everything he d1d was de-

nounced as useless or 1nterpreted as a plot.

The bead of all

pub11c documents estab11shed the h1erarcby of authority in
France--"The NatIon--The Law--The K1ng."
left to him, the nation declared he was

If he used the powers
~busing

them.

He was

in a position of marked 1nferiority to the Assembly, for he
oould not dissolve it; the appeal to the people was
42
bim.
He was tbe head of the

admlnistrati~n,

d~nIed

to

but how could

be rule min1sters who were elected by the natIon, and whom he
could neither dIsmiss or suspend from theIr functions.

"The

Assembly," writes Mirabeau, "has not created any executive
power • • • I maintain that no power can ex1st without agents
and w1tbout organs.-

43

The Assembly turned the King Into Its

chief servant, but did not grant this servant the poss1bi.1Ity· of
serv1ng well.
While these general prinoiples regard1ng the change
in executive power were being debated, the question of the King 'IS
acceptance of the constitution brought a new problem before the
Assembly.

Some remarked tbat the King might refuse the constI-

tutIon and thus act agaInst the general desire of France.

42
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•
M. Redon tried to prove that the Assembly had no right to even
think that the King's approval was necessary.

The fact that

the oahiers demanded it was sufficient to guarantee its acceptance.

Considering his critioal position in the eyes of the na-

tion, Louis XVI would not have the right to set himself against
the establishment of the revolution, that is, against the liberty of his people; he must sign and ratify the constItution
44
for himself and his successors.
On

February 4, 1790, Louis XVI unexpeotedly came to

the Assembly and after a short speech, in his own name and that
of the queen and his young son, sQlemnly took the oath to abide
by the Constitution whioh was being produced.

Formerly, Louis

XVI had refused to promulgate isolated fragments of the constitution, but had acoeded to the "resolutions of August 4 on condition that no attempt to diminish his exeoutive power was
45
made.
Now in February, Louis XVI was painfully reSigned to
the weakening of royal power.
Being informed of the adhesion of the
great majority to the constitution, I
now announce that I have relinquished
any claim to assist in that work; and
that when I, respons1ble to the nation
alone, thus abandon that claim, no one

44
45

Andrews, 28-35
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•

else has the right to feel aggrieved • • •
When I shall have loyally put in operation
all the means plaoed at my disposal, no reproaoh oan be laid to my oharge, and the
nation whose interest alone ou~ht to serve
as a guide, w1ll express itself by the
means reserved to it by the Constltution.46
After the Assembly had depr1ved Lou1s XVI of all
active power and had established h1s position as exeoutor of
the laws of the Assembly, the leaders saw that the Revolution
could not end until the exeoutive had regained some power.
This hope, however, was lost by the oonst1tution.

For some time

the members of the oommittee had debated the question of the
King's veto.

On

this question great interest oentered.

Shall

the KIng have an absolute veto? or a lImIted, a suspensive veto?
or no veto whatever?

were the quest10ns of the day in Franoe.

the journals, the olubs, the distriots and on the streets,
47
the veto was oalled the re-establishment of despotism.
In

In

the provinoes and in Paris there was proof of the

ignoranoe of the people oonoern1ng the veto.

The veto was oon-

sidered in the provinoes as the "most oruel tax" that oould be
introduoed 1nto Franoe.

46
4'7

In Paris also, they mIstook it for a

M. Guizot and Madame Gu1zot de Witt Franoe. (Vol. VI of
The Nations of the World) Peter Fenelon Collier and Son,
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de Hauranne, 75
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tax.

Baronass de Staal in the Consideration

~

the Frenoh

B!!-

olution states "they spoke of the v~e in the streets of Paris,
48
as of a monster that would devour little ohildren."
The veto was the popular desoription of what finally
appeared in the oonstitution under the heading ]! !! Sanotion
49
royale.
Sanotion had been in use for oenturies, but has had

-varioUS meanings.

M. GUillatin, substItuting the word "oonsent"

for that of "sanotion" proposed a draft of four artioles to determine the degree of power to be plaoed in the" hands of the
King.
1.

May the King refuse his oonsent to the oonstitution?

2.

May the King refuse his consent to acts of the legislative body?

3.

In oase the King should refuse his consent, is this
refusal to be suspensive or limited?

4.

In oase the King1s refusal is suspensive how long may
this refusal cont1nue--dur1ng one or two legislatures?
On

M. GuI11atin i s first question there was no need of

deliberating.

On

the seoond questIon, the result of the vot"es

were 730 for the affirmative, 143 for the negative, 76 not voting.

The third questIon was then put to a vote, and it was on

this one that the greatest interest centered.

48
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royal sanction in order to g1ve force to the laws; it was a
matter of deciding whether the refusal of the King should be
50
suspensive or unlimited.
In the last analysiS Lally-Tollendal
stated that to question whether the King's veto shall be suspensive or absolute is to question "whether there shall be a
King, and the liberty of the nation requires a King, requires
51
the King's prerogative, requires the K1ng's sanction."
M1rabeau supported the absolute veto with all his influence; Mounier
gave his approval to this also; Lafayette, in imitation "of the
~

Uhited states proposed the suspens1ve veto; S1eyes would admIt
no veto.

It had been assumed by him and all other members of

the Assembly that the King and the King's ministers would be the
exeoutive power in the new constitutIon, but 1t had never been
anticipated that they would be given power limited or unlimited
in the proceedings of the legislature.
tion of powers they were

tr~ing

The principle of separa-

to introduce would be violated

seriously by this action.
The question of the royal sanotion was then considered
from all angles by the Assembly.
England is absolute.
is limited.

50
51

The sanction of the King of

That of the PresIdent of the United States

Now the aristocraoy made their last desperate stand
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and fought fiercely.

Many of the popular party, alarmed in

view of the rapid progress of events advocated an absolute veto.
Its inconsistency, however, wIth all enlightened principles of
liberty was too apparent to be concealed.

If the principle of

the separation of powers were rigidly applied, the King must be
refused the smallest measure of legislative power.

The fate of

liberty seemed to depend upon this question, as the absolute
veto would enable the court, through the King, to annul every
52

popular measure.
Now the impulsive temper of the Assembly dominated and
men were anxious to express their feelings.

Those, who like

Mounier, valued English precedents proposed that the King should
have the power of vetoing any measure passed by the new legislature.

They seem to have forgotten that the King of England had
53
in reality lost the power of rejecting bills.
The only real

check upon legislation in England is the responsibility of the
Cabinet which controls the majority in the House of Commons.
Mlrabeau supported the absolute veto and expressed his views in
the debate of June 15.
Wben it becomes a question of the royal
prerogative, that is ••• the most precious
possession of the people. I believe the
veto of the king is so necessary, that .i£

52
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he did not possess it, I would rather
live in Constantinople than in France. 54
Mirabeau had gone back to Montesquieu's words, "It the execut ive
power has no means of arresting the enterprise of the legislative body, the latter will,become despotio; able to increase its
own powers contInually, it will finish by annihIlating all other
powers. 1I

He continues his debate thus:
Yes, I declare It, I know of nothing more
to be dreaded than the sovere1gn aristocracy of 600 persons, who being able tomorrow to deolare themselves irremovable
and the day after heredItary will finish
like aristocrats allover the world by
usurping everyth1ng.55

Mirabeau felt, that if the veto was rejected supreme exeoutive
power would pass from the King to the Assembly, and France
would then have 1200 tyrants instead of one.

The veto, he de-

clared, gave the people, through the K1ng, the means of check1ng
their own representatives.

56

Mirabeau sensed he was maintaining

an unpopular cause, and refrained from voting in the f1nal decision although the veto was advocated by h1m 1n all his Influ57

ence.
Similarly, the OPposing forces were well matched in

54
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tbiS beated debate.

,

~ieyes,

the famous spokesman for the third

estate, spoke against allowing the King any veto whatsoever.
III

define the law as tbe will of the governed:

therefore the

governing ought not to have any part in its formation."

The

functions of the legislature should never be assumed by the
king under any title whatsoever.

Another of his famous maxims,

lithe Assembly is the head, the king 1s the arm" proves he would
58

not admit any species of veto.

He held the view that an

assembly was 1n a batter position than a king to know the mind
of the nation; that the business of the executive was to carry
out the w11l of the legislature not to obstruct it; and that a
royal veto on the proceedings of a national assembly is nothing
less than a lettre 2! cachet 1ssued against the w1ll of the
people.

Lafayette, who had been influenced by the Amerioan pre-

cedent, wrote to Necker and Mounier 1n favor of the suspensive
veto, warning them of the disaster which might occur if they
59

tried to obtain more for the king.

The people of Paris as

Barnave, Duport, Lameth, and Alexandre, were more vehemently
opposed to the royal veto than those who sat in the Assembly.
They undertook the situation quite clearly; for if in normal

58
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•
times, the power of the King to check a decision of the parliament loses much of its importance, it is quite another thing in
a revolutionary period.

In ordinary times, a parliament would

seldom pass anything that the King would have to veto in the
interest of the privileged classes; while during a revolutionary
period, the decisions of a parliament may often tend towards the
destruction of ancient privileges, and consequently encounter
60
oppoSition from the King.
Mounier was unshaken; but Necker
and some of his colleagues told their friends in the House, that
unless the absolute veto could be carried by a decisive majority, it would be better to vote for the suspensive veto.

Among

hIs opponents, Mounier had some private frIends who opened negotiations with him.

They proposed to accept his absolute veto

and two Houses, if in return the Senate should have only a suspensive veto on the acts of the representatives, and that the
convention be held periodically to revise the constItution.
61
Tbese offers were signs of weakness.
During the debates on this subject it appeared, that
the majority of the members were so apprehensive of a return of
the old tyranny, that they were so solicitous to secure the

60
61
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•
legislative power from the attempts of the executive, that they
seem to have forgotten that it was a monarchical constitution
.bich they had professed to establish, and weakened the executive
62
power to such a degree as almost to render it useless.
The
question might have been debated forever; but on September 11,
after transactions none too clear, it became known that the King
would consent to promulgate the resolutions of August 4, if be
were granted a valid veto for two sessions.

Under this gentle-

man's agreement, the suspensive veto became part of the constitution the same day.

That the king should have a veto was re-

solved by 730 voices to 143; that the veto should be merely
63
suspensive was passed by 673 voices to 325.
It had, in fact, been carrIed less by the arguments
of the speakers than by urgency of the polItical sItuation,
since another attack on the capital was feared.

"The veto , n

they declared, ttbelongs to no individual but to twenty-five
million people."

The leaders of agitation were determined to

resist the threats of Paris.

In so strained a situation, the

deputies were willing to trust the King, to close the debate,
and to compromIse on a suspensive veto.

62
63
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and revolutionary instincts prevailed over philosophical or
political reasons; the national pride resented any imitation of
the English constitution; the prinoiple of the absolute veto was
64

rejected.
The suspensive veto meant that if the King refused to
sign a measure, the act could not be brought up again in that
assembly; but if it were passed without alteration in the two
~ollowing
~eto

assemblIes, it became a law without his consent.

The

might be applied not only to long-term constitutional laws

~ut

also to routine decrees by which the assembly was remodeling

~he

old regime, and dealIng with the emergenoies of the hour.

,

~us

by this substantial check upon his power, the King had im-

pressed upon himself and all the world that his position was now
~

subordinate and a regulated one.
When the Assembly had reconstructed the power of the

~xecutive,
~hat

it addressed the French people to give them confIdence

a constitutIon was being formed to assure their liberty

~orever.

It emphasized partIcularly that monarchy, so dear to

all the Frenoh, had been retained, but at the same time the
rights which the nation had lost to deoree its taxes and laws
had been restored.

~4

Guizot, 32
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We have destroyed the power of the executive--No, say
rather the power of the ministers, which in reality
formerly destroyed or often degraded the executive
power. We have enlightened the executive power by
showing it its true rights; we have above all enabled
it by traoing it to the true souroe of its power, the
power of the people. The executive power is now without foroe - against the constitution and the law, that
is true, but in support of them, it will be more powerful than ever before. 65
Although Louis XVI reoognized the oonstitutional
power officially, he saw in it only a usurpation of his royal
authority of whioh he did not wish any reduotion.

Even to the

last moment he never abandoned the hope of one day reduoing to
obedience this new power which he reproaohed himself for having
allowed it to grow by the side of his own.
~eality,

The Assembly, in

had given the king much greater power than the President

of the United States possesses.

A two-thirds vote of both houses

can immediately carry any measure against the veto of the President.
Sometimes the French Revolution has been attributed
~o

the influence of the Amerioan Revolution, and there is no

~oubt

that the establishment of the independence of the colonies

~rom

Great Britain hastened the Revolution; but the movements

~ere

made by entirely different peoples.

The enumeration of the

rights of man came from America, and the American Declaration of

p5

Robinson, 21-23
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•

Independenoe oontains some of the abstraot theories of Frenoh
philosophers whioh burst forth in 1789.

The Deolaration of

Independenoe was entirely the work of Jefferson, and therefore,
66
was influenoed by Frenoh writers.
Also the history of republican ideas had been

~ead

by all enlightened Frenchmen in the

Constitution of the United States.

This constitution had organ-

ized the rule of separation of powers and had given to publio
law a precision and a fixity unknown to the anc1e~ regime.

In

the United States the oonstitutional dootrine that no political
organ possesses inherent powers is fundamental.

The exeoutive

as well as the legislative and judicial branches derive their
powers from the same souroe--the people.

The branches of gov-

ernment are separate, and in a large measure independent of one
another in the operations.

Frenoh writers had sought refuge in

England and found there freedom of thought and speeoh.

They aiso

found a free government in which the king and the court were not
absolute, but in whicb a national legislature oontrolled the
state and determined who should be the ministers, and under
which public burdens were borne by all classes alike.
returned to France they made known their disoovery.

66
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the French did not borrow English institutions at the outset,

but it gave them a living example of the results which they might
hope to reach if they could first make the government over.
France, now had adopted this instrument of government, but her
greatest problem was to distribute the powers without weakening
67
the general government.
She had subordinated the executive,
and now turned her attention to the organization of the legis lature.

67 Bernard Roelher liThe Constitutions of France, Monarchical
and Republican." Southern Quarterly Review. January, 1850,
Vol. 16, No. 32, 503
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CHAPTER III
ORGANlZA'l'ION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY

When the Assembly passed the Declaration of the Righte
of Man, they acted in harmony for the last time.

The establish-

ment of principles did not involve agreement in policy; but when
the time carne to apply these principles to the constitut1on,
division arose among the members of the assembly.

Nevertheless,

all parties adhered strictly to the pr1nciple established by the
1
Rights of Man, that the nation transmits power.
The Const1tution preserved the hereditary monaroh, .but in the organization
of the leg1slative department the Assembly desired to limit the
powers of the king in aocordance with Montesquieu's formula for
the separation of powers which had been introduoed into the
United States.

The debates on the Deolaration of the Rights of

Man had shown the strong line of demarcat10n between the supporters of different philosophical writers.

However, when the or-

ganization of the legislature was proposed Political differences
began to appear.

The over-emphasis upon legislation which the

Constitution of 1791 shows was a reflection of the dominant
spirit of the assembly.

1 Acton, 109

r
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From time to time, the questIon is often asked by a
stranger 'passing through a country, "who makes the law?" and
then in turn "what are the principal objects of these laws?"
In ancient law, if the formula has been transmitted correctly,

the documents are silent on the participation of the people in
the formation of the ordinances.
~rom

In the documents emanating

the King during the Middle Ages, there 1s no mention of

~epresentation

in makIng the laws.

However, these royal ord1-

pances sometimes did not merit the name of law.

2

A letter addressed to the Sequin, the Archbishop of
~ens,

illustrates the fact that if the King himself in the early

penturies did not pass legislation then the nobility assumed
~his

duty.

It further states that thIS 1s a tradition greater

~han

Hugh Capet.

The last Caroling1ans promulgated only a small

p.umber of laws and this weakness 1n legislative power continued
~der

the Capet1ans.

It 1s said that Hugh Capet followed the

~oyal

custom of promulgating laws; but if he d1d, they have never
3

peen found.
~lone.

During the M1ddle Ages, also, the King rarely acted

He promulgated the general ord1nances and legislated in

lommon with the lords; although the law was issued in the name of
~he

~
p

King, it had been accepted beforehand by the suzerains.

Vi ollet, 189
IbId., 191

r
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During the thirteenth oentury, Beaumanoir, one of the

theorists of the day, fails to mention the dependenoe of the
King on the vassals, but on the other hand he does not attribute
the prinoiple of full legislative power to the King.
to Beaumanoir, general oounoils suoh as
Great Counoil) were established.

~

Aooording

Grand Conseil (The

At the olose of the thirteenth

oentury, this was the only one that remained of all that onoe
had been of suoh great importanoe in the early twelfth and thirteenth oentury.

The courts did not disappear entirely in this

century, but they beoame soaroer and scarcer and soon disappeared
The power exeroised by St. Louis during this century,
without a doubt, oontributed to the development of a centralized
authority.

The feudal barons beoame oonscious of the end to

whioh the development of the monarchy was leading and they saw
the neoessity to resist since their demands would have oompletely
overthrown the monarohy and restored old feudal independenoe.
However, Louis IX had been arbitrator between the Count of
Provenoe, and the Count of Toulose, and later between the King
of England and his barons.

In addition, his high moral standard

and his military aohievements made him greatly esteemed among
other Christian princes, and thus he conquered his royal domain
with an authority unknown to predeoessors.

Therefore, at the

end of the thirteenth oentury, the King had assumed sufficient

59

•
power to make the greater part of his kingdom accept his orders
4
and decisions.

Toward the middle of the fourteenth century, the King
had established a group of offices, such as the Parlement, and
the Chamber of Accounts in order to assure the regularity of
business during his administration.

As it often happens, the

actions of the King were assumed by these assemblies, and the
instruments which he had created for good became impediments to
his reign.

Thus the King was hindered by his own officers.

On

the other hand, he gave directly to the Cbancellor, a control
over certain acts which should have been reserved for bis own
good.

Thus, there rose up around the throne diverse groups,

formed of elements whose resistance marred tbe flexibility of
5

tbe king.
During the Middle Ages, law was an ideal whicb not
only represented tbe wisdom of past centuries, but served as the
connecting link between tbe present and the past.

Tbe sovereign

power of tbe Middle Ages was not to cbange the law, but to assure
1ts respect; if, therefore, the law of anc1ent times bad been
modified, it was tbe duty of tbe King to re-establish it witbout

4
5
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altering the established customs of the country.

•
TOday law is

regarded as anything which has been voted and promulgated according to a constitution.

The fathers of anoient law did not give

this free interpretation to the word.

In France, loi was used

only on rare oocasions and signified the oommand of authorIty;
it guarded a very speoial treasure for the nation.
important measures, the

For less

meaning a deoree, was used.

word~,

In the late r.uddle Ages, law was made: . one did not make law.
The theory regarding the promulgation of law was that wisdom and
experienoe were the two fundamental prinoiples neoessary to
assure the people of a just law.

Therefore, the King was to

sense the needs of the people and issue laws which would give
security to the people without presenting this law to the scrut16

py of an assembly.
The first movement for representation in the formation of law began in the provInces.

The King authorized and rat-

ifIed their deorees and in thIs way contributed to the exterior
life of the people; the de put1es inf luenced the deorees, but it
was the people who made the ordinances.
~ges,
~he

Thus during the Middle

the theory concerning the participation of the people in

formation of law was a minor problem to the king; but after

1789 when it became a reality it resulted in a great re-organlza-

~

Viollet, 200
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tion in the legislative system of France.
When the assembly had secured the Position of the
executive, it turned its attention to the organization of the
legislative body of the nation.

In a substantial discourse in

the principles of representative monarchy, Lally-Tollendal established the fact that the King ought to be an integral part
of the legislature, not only because it resulted from French
tradition but because it conformed to the nature of affairs.

It

had been agreed that the legislative power had been controlled
not by the King himself, but by the councils.

All the initia-

tive of legislation rested with them, and by them, all laws were
7

shaped and drafted.

It was not agreed whether their edicts

possessed full force of law without the assent of the high courts
or parliament.
As many plans had been proposed for the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, so too there were many for the formation
of the new legislative power.

Lally-Tollendal suggested the

following:
1. That the legislative body ought to

be composed of three parties-- a
King, a senate, and a House of Representatives.

7

Lowell,

6
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2. That the King ought to have the right of
convoking the legislative body at certain
times fixed by the constitutIon, and of
prolonging it or dissolving it, and of
calling another when one adjourns.
3. That the sanction ought to belong to the
King, and the 1nitiative exclus1vely to
one chamber or another. All bills for
revenue ought to originate in the House
of Representatives.
4. That the House of Representatives ought
to be the sole accuser, and the Senate
the solitary judge of public officials.
The acousatlon, the trias' and the judgment ought to be pub11c.

Mounier then came forward with his plan for the organization of the legislative body.

He suggested:

1. That NatIonal assemblies would be permanent and would convene every year on
December, and sit for four months.
2. That royal sanction would be neoessary
for all future legislative acts, but not
for the pending oonstitution.
3. That taxes would be levied for a limIted
time only.
4. That the legislature would be separated
into a Senate and a House of Representatives.
5. That France would be div1ded into distriots
of 150,000,000 inhabitants from which one
representative chosen by the elected deputies would be named as delegate to the
assembly for three years.
6. That neither the ministers of the King nor
his representatives in the province could
be chosen delegates.
7. That royal orders be prohibited.
8. That the King would have the power of dissolution and the power to oall a royal session.
9. That the initiative would belong exolusively
to the legislative body.

~

Arthur Young Travels in France.
New York, 1889, 150

George Bell and Sons,

,..,
63

10. That revenue laws be introduced in the
Senate, and that it be permitted to
cbange the laws after they had been voted
upon by the house. 9
During the session of the Assembly from August 27,
1789 until October, 1'789, the permanance of the Assembly, the
division into two bodies, and the royal veto were discussed.
The Moderates or Liberals who were predominant in the work of
the constitution hoped by the division of powers and the multiplication of checks to make their cou?try\as free as England
or America.

Mounier possessed the necessary tact; Clermont

Tormerre and Lally-Tol.lenda1 were gifted orators; Ma1ouei.. was
10
their cautious adviser.
fbey desired to control the representatives by a second chamber, by the royal veto, and by the
right of dissolution.
In his report to the assembly, the Bishop of Bordeaux

urged the members to center their attention on two important
questions relating to the composition and organization of the
legislative body.

The first question was whether the body

should be periodic or permanent.

The majority of the cahiers

suggested a recurrent assembly, but the committee had voted
unanimously for a permanent body.

Agreement on this question

had been reached, since they feared that if the legislative

9 de Hauranne, 71-73
10 Acton, 109
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power acted by fits and starts every three or five years, the

stability of the state would be threatened.

At each convoca-

tion, the general excitement would cause a disturbance in public
tl"B.hquflllty, while its intermittent character vvould encourage
the introduction of abuses and France would once again fall into
11

the power of ministers.

The assembly would not only meet

every year but would continue to exist from one meeting to another.
The opinion of the committee was not equally decided
on the composition of the legislative body.

Should this Nation-

al Congress meet in one chamber or in two was the all absorbing
question.

The advocates of a single chamber felt they could

rely with confidence upon the example of the one in which they
were assembled. The good works resulting from it were already
12
They further urged that it is common will which
eVident.
makes the law, and it is at its best in a Single chamber; any
division of the legislative body would destroy its unity and
thus render impossible the best institutions and the most salutary reforms.

The division of the assembly, they urged, would

produce a condition of discord and strife, and political inertia
would emanate from this.

AS a result, France would once more be

exposed to the dangers of a new aristocracy which it wished to

11 Andrews, 38
/
12 Alexis C. Tocquevi lle L1ancien re~ime et la revolution.
Michel Levy Freres, Paris, 1856, 2 8
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13
avoid.

The representatives stated logically that the branches

of government were being organized according to the desires of
the nation as expressed in the cahiers.

The people understood

that a second chamber in a revolution was impossible since it
could only act when the revolution was exhausted and a period of
reaction had set in.
14
power.

Thus they asked unity in the legislative

Others, on the contrary, held that the division of the
legislative body into two chambers was necessary to prevent all
deception and haste and to assure maturity of deliberations.
England and America were again used to show the utility of two
chambers.

It 1s true, they said, that in a time of reorganiza-

tion a single body is

pr~ferred,

but for the constitution which

had just been established two chambers were neC,essary to preserve and stabilize this document.

The nation was trying to

abolish the intervention of the King in legislation, but compared to the resistless force of a single chamber expressing the
desire of the nation, the 'King1s interference would be worthless
15
One chamber, they pOinted out, might influand ineffective.
ence the King to alter the legislative system and, consequently,

13 Andrews, 16-17
14 Kropotkin, 147
15 Andrews, 17
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bring new uprisings to the nation.

•
One body might easily be

encouraged to reach decisions either by ministers directed
against them, or by intrigue; and the faulty legislation resulting from these hasty decisions would shortly lead back to the
old despotism or new anarchy.

However, they added that in the

division of the legislative body the distinction of orders
should be abolished, for the dangers of aristocracy were to be
more feared since now they would have the seal of legality.

16

Mounier, as reporter of the committee, recommended
that there should be two chambers in the new French legislature
as there were in England; but before any explanation was made of
the proposed chambers a very warm debate arose.

Although there

were many admirers of English institut10ns 1n France, they were
greatly outnumbered in the Assembly by those Frenchmen who
thought it derogatory to copy England and who wished to present
17
something very original and very perfect by themselves.
Mounier held that sovereignty resides in the nation, but operates through delegates aPPOinted or elected by the people.

If

these representatives have no other check than the executive
power, they may pass among themselves unwise legislation.

16
17

Two
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ohambers deliberately separated assures the oontrary.

l~

The great majority of the earlier leaders of the
Assembly were, like Mounier, in favor of the two chambers.
Lally-Tollendal insisted on the division of the legislative and
the unity of the exeoutive.

]n

order to obtain equilibrium in

the government, eaoh ohamber should have a partioular interest
independent of the general interest oommon to both ohambers,
and at the same time be part of the whole system.

Unity, swift-

ness, and flexibility are the essenoe of exeoutive power; therefore, it should be oonoentrated in one hand.

Deliberation, slow

ness, and stability ought to oharaoterize the legislative power;
19

therefore, it should be divided.
Before the division of the legislature was deoided
upon, new debates arose on the organization of this National
Congress.

If it should meet in two ohambers, would the upper

house be an aristooratio, hereditary body like the House of
Lords in the British Parliament, or an eleotive republioan Sen20
ate, as in the Amerioan Congress.
The people would not oonseni
to an hereditary House of Lords, whioh would be an impregnable

18 de Hauranne, 72
19 Ibid., 69-70
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fortress for the illegal seizure of royal power.

•
They were in-

olined to agree upon an upper house to be composed exclusively
of the clergy and the nobles, but to be elected by the people.
They were opposed to an election of the upper house even by the
nobles and the clergy, for the high lords and great dignitaries
of the Church looked down upon the lower nobility and the work21
ing people.
'Ithe masses of people became more and more irritated and clamored for a single chamber.
Lally-Tollendal also proposed an organization of a
second ohamber.

He would have an upper house open to nobles,

clergy, and deputies since a,separation of orders no longer
existed, but his problem arose over the selection of these rep_
resentatives.

If the people elected them, many members of the

Assembly would be insulted.
power would be given to him.

If the King seleoted them, great
Therefore, as a compromise, he

would give the King the right of selecting the Senate from a
list of candidates drawn up by the provincial assemblies.

In

this marmer, the senators would neither be hereditary nor
elected temporarily; they would be elected for life.

Thus the

upper house would have neither the mobility of an eleotive
chamber, nor the immobility of the aristooracy, and the problem
22
would be solved.

--------21 Abbott, 149
22 Moore, 414
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Those who opposed the veto were as violent against the
tWO houses.

They feared that the influenoe of the court would

at some time or another form the upper hquse and make it hered1tary.

They refused to see all the advantages of the British
23
ponst1tution, and declaimed against its abuses.
Perhaps the
proposal of two chambers might have been carried had it not met
with strong opposition from a quarter where it was least expect.
ed--from the nobles themselves wbo were against an upper chamber
because of their Situations and their opinion.

From the "super-

abundant noblesse" of France, only a small portion could be
chosen to form an upper ohamber.

Many of those, who saw little

probability of becoming members of this house, could not bear to
see those who were their equals, or perhaps inferior, obtain a
,
place in the upper chamber; therefore, they were ag1~t the
24
~easure

•
Others of the nobility 1magined that those who had

~irst

jOined the Third Estate would be promoted, and they became-

irate when they considered that men, whom they considered traitors, would be placed at the head of a chamber as a reward for
their deed.

Some of the higher orders were opposed to the Revo-

lution in any form, and believed that this regulation would give

23
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25

the movement stability.
The project of the two houses was disliked by the
,

public in general, but especially by Sieyes and many of the
deputies of the Third Estate who considered it as a plan calculated for favoring a portion of the nobility above the other
members of the National Assembly.

They recognized that some

factor was necessary to delay and reconsider legislation, but
most of the Frenchmen making the constitution were inexperienced
in political science, and impetuous and enthusiastic for a con26
stltution for France.
A Senate was for different reasons unacceptable to
both sides of the Assembly.

Tbe Left disliked it since it was

direct divergence from the political ideals of Rousseau who, in
his Contract Social, condemns any check or delay of popular resolutions.

They were haunted with a fear of royal and aristo-

cratic reaction.

They thought that even a Senate of the Ameri-

can type would hinder the fulfillment of their principles.
27
Right were also hostile, or at least indifferent.

The

The vast gatherings at the Royal Palace soon became

25 John S. C. Abbott "The States General."· Harper's New
Monthly Magazine. August, 1857, Vol. 15, No. 87, 314
26 Young, 157
27 The Cambridge Modern History, 180-181
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unanimous tn asking for one chamber when it was brought to their
attention that several members of the Assembly were suggesting
a third chamber.

They claimed that the question was not clearly

stated and believed that the unity of the Assembly did not exclude the division of the chamber.

However, with this suggest-

ion the Assembly recalled all to the cpestion of two chambers.
The vote which was taken by roll call on September 10, 1'789, resulted in a tally of "499 votes for a single chamber; 89, for
28
two chambers; and 122, lost or not voting. 1I
Thus for a second
time, the nobles prevented a check upon hasty legislatIon.
On

the rejection of his plan of organization, Mounier

at once resigned his seat on the constitutional committee, as
did also Bergasse, Lally-Tollendal and Clermont-Tonnerre.
the first constitutional committee came to an end.

Thus

A new com-

mittee was chosen including Sieyes, Talleyrand, Le Chapeleur,
Thouret, Target, Desmeuniers, and Tronchet.

The new committee

contained no representatives from the nobilIty, and Talleyrand
could not be considered as a representative of the clery.

It

represented the Left party in the Assembly--the body who desired
29
the form of the monarchy while destroying the substance.

28 PhIlip J. Buchez et P. C. Roux Histoire parlementaire
fran~aise.
Paulen Libraire, Paris, 1834, 19-20
29 The Cambridge Modern History, 183
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The legislative power now consisted of a single

chamber, and the number of representatives was fixed at 745.
They were distributed among the Departments on the threefold
basis of extent of land, of population, and of the amount paid
in direct taxes.

According to territory, there were 247; accord

ing to population, 249; and according to taxes, 247.

The leg-

islative department, since equality had just been proclaimed
among all the citizens elected the representatives by universal
30
However, it considered it necessary to establish
suffrage.
some conditions for the exercise of political rigbts, so it proclaimed citizens as active and passive.

Active citizens bad the

right to vote without any qualifications; passive citizens were
tbose who voted with a low property qualification.

Voting was

in two stages; the active citizens assembled by cantons to
choose the electors (one for every 150 people); the electors
assembled by departments to choose tbe 745 members of the
Assembly.
The legislature was to last two years and the King bad
no power to prolong it or dissolve it, and at the end of this
term, a new election followed naturally.

The legislature might

adjourn itself, but during tbe period of adjournment, the King

...........

30 Ibid., 202
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might at certain times convoke it.

The deputies were consid-

ered as representatives of the entire nation, and therefore not
bound by instructions from their constituents.

31

The legisla-

ture was given the right to exercise the legislative power conjointly with the King.

The representatives gave or refused

freely their consent to all taxation; they voted the laws; decided the budget; ratified treaties; and had the right to bring
before a High Court the Ministers, public officials and all
'accused of attempts or conspiracies against the safety of the
32

State or Constitut1on.

Its executive power was only limited

by the King's suspensive veto, which did not extend to financial
bills.

Its oonsent was necessary to proclaim war, and to ratify

treaties of peaoe, oommerce, and alliance; but was debarred from
any exercise of judicial power.
The unicameral system waS preferred

t~

the bicameral:

system of England for two reasons: (1) the desire to fuse the
deputies of the three estates into a single national assembly;
(2) the difficulty of finding in a nation in which privileged
classes no longer exist the elements with which to form an upper
33
and a lower house.
Thus France had produced a second factor
to check the power of absolutism in France.

31 Brissaud, 552
32 de Hauranne, 61
33 Br1ssaud, 552

CHAP1'ER IV

ORGANI2'A'l'ION OF THE JUDICIAL POWER

Whenever a small or large group of people participate
1n a game, a debate, or in business, they must be governed by
rules or laws.

Some person or persons are ohosen or vested with

authority to have the final decision whenever there 1s oonfusion
on the meaning of the rules.

In all units of government, an

agenoy or a person is needed to interpret the laws and to determine the penalties that should be plaoed on those who disobey
the laws.

After the law has been interpreted, questions con-

cerning punishment for offenders arise.
~

To deoide suoh questions

judicial or court system has been established by the govern-

ments of the nations.
To Frenohmen in 1789, justice seemed the most impor-.
Itant part of good government.
~ahiera
~hey

were so

unanImou~

There was notbing about whioh the

as the need for judicial reform.

When

spoke of a sIngle law for tbe Whole country under which the

abuses of authority would be impossible, they thought of a

c~v11

and criminal code to put an end to tbe cruelties and injustices
1

pf the old courts.

The judicial system as well as the admin-

istrative system of France bad grown up in the course of ages;

1 Thompson, 144
74
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had never been revised on broad principles; and had ended in
confusion and waste of power.
complicated.

The old system was cumbrous and

There was complaint of tbe excessive number of

courts--ecclesiastical, seignorial (about 80,000;000), administrative, and exceptional.

A suitor· sometimes remained suspended

for long years since appeals and petitions leading him from one
court to another made lawsuits endless.

The penalties inflicted
2

ranged from small fines to execution by banging.

Frequently,

those led to oI;J.e court found themselves deprived of their natu..
ml judges;

also~

the tribunals were not easily accessible, and

public law was still impeded with remnants of feudalism.

While

the old magistracy, as a whole, was distinguished for its integrity,the sale of judgeships and the extravagant judicial
fees could not fail to cast a shadow over its good name.
As the King increased hiS power over the

nat10n~

he

also exercised in an increasing degree judicial authority.

He

considered it one of the essential functions of the King.

He 1s

judge of all his subjects, and according to an expression of the
fifteenth century, he is the grand debiteur
the

prov1nces~

~

justice.

3

In all

although sometimes concealed under diverse pre-

texes, the hand of the King was working through his intendant

2
3
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judging civil cases, and pronouncing grave penalties--the galley

or death.

During the medieval period courts had multiplied so

that every lord had the right and duty of holding a court for
his tenants.

Feudal, corporate, and ecclesiastical courts left

little for the royal courts.

By degrees, the royal courts over-

spread France and withdrew the business from the other courts.
Duty and interest compelled the Kings of France to assume this
4

new power.
The notion that the King was the head of all justice
was a recognized fact to the people.

Philip I made it a solemn

obligation for the King to preserve for himself and his
~rs

the office of sole custodian of law.

succes~

lilt is your right to

guard whole and entire the law of the land" was the last recommendation of the dying Louis XIV to his successor.

Charles V

on his deathbed had the crown carried to him and addressed it
with this apostrophe:

"And you, Crown of France, how precious

you are ••• precious at an inestimable price, since the secret
5

of justice resides within you.

Royalty and the administration

of justice were two factors which tradition had cemented together.

Ordinarily, the King commissioned the power of judging

to his court, and in the provinces, the King delegated this

4
5
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•
mission to his officers; but nevertheless, this did not detract
from his character as judge.

He held the power of judging doubt-

ful cases, and he alone could pronounce the death penalty.

To

the people of France this power appeared in a different light
than we consider it since the King was considered as/having the
6

power of life and death over his subjects.

According to some,

he had the power of putting to death one-third of his subjects,
of torturing another third, and of assuring tranquillity and
peace to the other third.

In the cah1ers, the third estate ex-

pressed,its condemnation of this apparent justice.

7

This absolute conception of loyalty resulted in fruitful movements which further enlarged and consolidated the power
of the King.
~itted

All jurisdiction of the provinces was to be sub-

to royal authority since this would give the King the

power of diverse control.

The writ of appeal was considered one

of the most important functions of the judicial system, and as. it
~eveloped it augmented the King's power.
~ges

if a vassal was refused justice by his lord, he oould ask

~ustice
~ing

For during the Middle

from the King.

to vassal.

Messages then were sent directly from

,

During the ancien regime justice was sometimes

~
If
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arbitrary as in the lettres de cachet, aIld often unequal when
oases were moved from one oourt to another, and always very slow
and very oostly.

In the literature of the day, pUQlic opinion

waS aroused toward the rigor ot the oriminal law, and against a
mode of criminal trial which was direoted toward the doom of the
aocused.

In this respeot, the Revolution had muoh to reform.

There were in France parlements, or courts, whioh had
too much or too little political power to be satisfied with just
being judges.

Discord prevailed among the judges; they quarreled

about their origin and theirtunctions.

Sometimes they issued

proclamations making known the will of the King; at other times
they forbade the execution of the K1ng 1 s orders.

8

When they re-

sisted obstinately, after a oertain number of royal commands, to
register his edicts, the King, acoompanied by prinoes, peers,
and a few notables, went to the parlement.

There he made them

strike out all. deorees oontrary to his will

a~d

edicts he desired.

These provincial

parleme~

insert the
had been organ-

ized in the late Middle Ages and were members of the parlement
of Paris.' The parlements were powerful instruments of unity
and centralization, since the King could suspend them or imprison the ministers if they went against his wish.

He delegat-

ed justice to the parlements, but be did not alienate his power

. 8 Higgins, 3-4

-
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•
of judgingj he reserved to himself the judgment of important de9

oisions.

If the parlement of Paris arrested, the King remained

tbe sovereign jUdge on the case.

It expressed its authority

once when it stated that the French monarchy "would be reduced
to a state of despotism if the ministers cont1nued to abuse the
authority of tbe King by disposing of persons through lettres de
oachet, of property by the

~

courts of justice by exile."

de justice; by suspending the
The King responded that the

members of parlernent were not the true interpreters of the
people.
~lood,

In the parlement seats were held by the princes of royal

the peers of the kingdom, the grand officers of the crown,

prelates, marshals of France, governors of provinoes, the councilors of state, two magistrates of the Chambre

~

comptes

11

of

Paris, and a deputy of eaoh provinoial earlement.
Soon, however, the earlement of Paris broke their
silence and threw off their respectfulness.

It demanded that

~he

state of finances should be given to it since it should know

~he

amount of revenue in order to estimate the expenditures.

~he

parlement tried to attack an abuse or plaoe a restraint on

If

royal authority, the King oonsidered this as an attempt to curb

9 Viollet, 222
10 de Hauranne, 8
11 Tocqueville, 86
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bis authority and resisted energetically.
tbe

~arlement

If, on the contrary,

defended some inequality which the King desired to

abolish but was powerless to do so, he then ceded full authority
12

to the parlement to obtain his wish.
Finally, behind the Chatelet and parlements stood the
ultimate court of appeal, the Conseil du Roi, the center of
justice in France.

The King's council also possessed no small

part of the judiciary powers.

The custom of removing private

causes from the regular courts, and trying them before one or
another of the royal councils, was a great and growing one.
This appellate jurisdiction was due in theory partly to the doctrine that the King was the origin of justice; and partly to the
idea that political matters could not safely be left to ordinary
tribunals.

The notion that the King owes justice to all his sub-

jects and that it is an act of grace, perhaps even a duty on his
part, to administer it in person when it is possible to do so,
is as old as the monarchy itself.

Thus the ancient custom of

seeking justice from a royal judge merely served to transfer
jurisdiction to an irregular tribunal.

Its circumference em-

braced a complicated system of departmental courts with subor_
dinate and embarrassing jurisdiction.

12

Higgins, 67

In 1789, reformer.s agreed

.
that the number of courts must be reduced.
of private and privileged jurisdictions.

81

There must be an end
Magistrates must no

longer be obtained by heredity or by purchase.

Bribery must be

abolished.
The first proposal for reform came from the group that
had supported a second chamber and the absolute veto.

Bergasse

presented the outline for a new judicial system on August 17.
Since the time of Montesquieu, it was a known fact that a ju.. ,
ic1al power should exist independent of the legislative and executive power.

Bergasse's plan was to keep the judiciary dis-

tinct from the executive and the legislative, wholly to abolish
purchase, to abolish the penalty of confiscation and introduoe
13
an element of popular election by appointment.
At first, ther
was hesitation in recognizing the judicial power as distinct
from the executive.

However, the Constitution followed the doc-

trine of Montesquieu and adopted the system of election of
judges.

The question of judicial power, as all other questions,

was discussed in long debates.

However, the men of 1789 set

down their decisions very briefly in the Constitution of 1791.
Twenty-seven articles lay down the charter of revolutionary
justice.

13

The judiciary is to remain independent of the

Thompson, 147
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legislature and exeoutive.

Justioe will be administered free

of oharge by justioes eleoted from t1me to time by the people.
Judges of every degree were eleoted.

14

To those draft1ng the oon-

stitution this was a return to primitive rights.

Bourke stated

"until the year 697 ••• the people had ohosen the1r own judges,
and from this year they began to lose their rights."

The people
15
were to take baok onoe again the power usurped by the K1ng.
The judioial power thus oreated was not a true politioal power.

','

Politioal powers organize and oonduot sooiety. ' The

judioial power, bound by law, interprets and applies law and
does not have the spontaneity, the init1ative, the power of d1'o..
~eotion

and organization.

In prinoiple, the struoture of the

judioiary should not ohange from generation to generation sinoe
it remains outside politioal institutes.

However in 1789, the

revolution was so profound that it touohed the judioial power
16
as well as all others.
Judioial reorganization was modeled first on the prinoiple that all powers emanated from the nation.

Thus, as in the

other powers, the sovere1gnty of the people was applied to the
judioiary.

The people delegated 1ts power to the judges, and

asked in return a just dealing from them.

14
15
16

Appendix IV
Made11n, 126
Deslandres, 120-121

Here the people had
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taken the place of the King.

The second principle rigorously

applied was the separation of powers.

"The ,judicial power,"

states the constitution of 1791, "is not able in any case to be
17
exercised by the legislative or the King."
The same independence 1s given to the legislative departments.

The third princi-

ple applied in the domain of justice was the abolition of arbitration.

Articles IV to XIX of the judicial power develop

minutely the individual liberty of the people.

18

Another char-

acteristic of the new system was the renderIng of justice gratuitous ly.
Finally, the judicial system established two new
Inst1tutions--the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the High National
Oourt.

The Supreme Court of Appeal was to pass judgment on

cases which expressed a contradiction in law.
~ad

All law in France

been unified, and a supreme magistrate was needed to inter-

pret the law.

It was obliged to render equal sentences on like

cases from different tribunals. It was considered indispensable
,
19
~or the just function of justice.
The High National was formed
of members of the Supreme Court of Appeal and exercised jurisdiction over members and actions which disturbed the general stability of the nation.

17
18

19

Appendix "LV
IbId.,
Deslandres, 123

It consisted of a court and a jury which
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exeroised authority either over men oocupying high State positions, or over orimes committed against the State itself.

Thus

the oonstitution had found an institution to guarantee the nation against men too powerful, or of orimes too grave to be
20
judged by ordinary judges.
The King's oouncil whioh had possessed strong judioiary power were now responsible to the legislative body under the new oonstitution.

Thus the separation of

powers struok a serious blow at the jur!sdAotion of the oounoil.
The new administrative divisions served as judicial
divisions also, and the King was refused the power to interfere
in any way in the eleotions.

The old oourts inoluding the

parlements were one after another abolished.

In eaoh district,

there was a oivil judge and a oriminal oourt whose justices were
eleoted by the eleotors of the district.

Each district was divid

ed into cantons which held primary eleotions to eleot justices of
the peace for trying petty cases, and to prevent laWSUits.
Superfluous courts and the inheritanoe of judges thus disappear21
ed from France.
Thus much remedial legislation acoompanied this new
framework.

The procedure of a trial was rendered more favorable

to the accused since trial by jury as in England was adopted in

20

~l

The Cambridge Modern History, 206
r:-Cahen et R. Guyot t'oeuvre legislative de la revolution.
Libraire Felix Alcon, Paris, 1913, 42
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orimina1 oases; every department was now equipped with a grand
jury.

Under the old system the maxim, "all justice emanates

from the King" now became "all justice emanates from the nation.
Justice was now rendered in the name of the State. Securities
were taken against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the
law was made the same for all without distinction of persons.
A new penal oode, similar to the criminal law in force in other
countries, was drawn up.
nized as crimes.

Heresy and magiO were no longer recog-

Tort?re was abolished; and the punishment ot

death, formerly meted out for slight offences, was confined to
22
.
four or five grave offences.
In criminal matters, after the
accusation is admitted, it must be recognized and declared by
the jury.

The trial w111 be public, and the help of a oonsul

may not be refused the accused person.

Anyone aoquitted by a

legal jury may never be retaken or acoused for the same faot.
All men seized and led before the police must be examined
~ately

or at least within twenty-tour hours.

If he 1s not

imme~
f~und

gUilty, he must be freed immediately.; if he is, and is able to
give suffioient bond where the law permits him to be free, he
23
must be freed.'
The commissionaire of the King would examine the

22
23

Brissaud, 560
Cahen, 42-44
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deoision given by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High
National Court and see

~hat

the judgment was exeouted.

If the

minister of Justioe exoeeded the bounds of power, he would be
denounoed to the High Court of Appeal through the oommissionaire
of the King.

If he were aocused of treason, the orime would go

to the legislative body who would render a seoret decision and
24
return it to the High National Court.
The Constitutional Assembly, considering the judioial
power as one of the manifestati ons of nati.onal sovereignty
believed that those who exeroised it should be elected, pass
certain qualifioations, and have some experience.

In the

anoien regime, most of the munioipal officers did not know how
to read or write and oould not understand the oomplioated
decrees and instruotions whioh came from Paris.

25

Therefore,

the Assembly provided that no one oould be seleoted as a judge
who was not twenty-five years of age, and had not practioed
law for five years.

The term of office was six years.

The prinoiple that a tribunal oonsists of several
,
judges was preserved from the anoient regime, but deorees of
jurisdiotion were abolished since all tribunals ware now equal
and appeals could be taken from one court to another.

24

25

Ibid" 45
Ta1ne, 199

Three
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k1nds of tribunals were created: ordinary or d1strict courts,
just1ces of peace, and a Court of Review.
carded the w1g and gown of the old regime.

The new judges disThe Court of Review

was to 1nsure a uniform interpretation of the law throughout
the State.

al~

Thus the un1formity of decisions was recognized as

a necessary compliment of legislative unity. However, 1f the
power of judg1ng were not separate from the leg1slat1ve and executive powers, there would be no liberty of the power of judg1ng.

It it were joined to the legislature, the 11fe and 11berty

of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge then

w~uld

be the leg1s1ator.

If

it were joined to the

execut1ve power, the judge might behave with all the violenoe of
26
an oppressor.
From the simplified judic1al organizat1on with
which the Constitut1onal Assembly endowed the country, oerta1n
consequences followed; namely, the abolition of exceptional
courts, and jurisdiction privileges.

All citizens were obliged
27
to sue before the same judges and according to the Same form.
The separation of the judicial branoh from the execut1ve and legislat1ve produoed three important results in
Franoe.

26
27

H1ggins, 41
Br1ssaud, 561
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1. Justioe oould not be administered
by the King, nor in general by
the holders of exeoutive power,
nor by the legislative body.
2. Conversely, the judges oould not
bring the members· of the administration before them for aots
done in their off1oes. The
deo1s1ons of administrative oontroversies were entrusted to the
administrative bodies themselves.
3. The judge oould not meddle in
the exeroise of legislative power
whether by jurisdiotion or the
exeout1on of laws, nor oould they
pass upon the Constitutionality
of laws. 28
The separation of powers was now oompleted.

Three distinot

organs of government were substituted for the fountainhead of
all author1ty--the King's will.

28

~.,
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CONCLUSION
The Constitution of 1791 was a protest against absolute power; therefore, this power was weakened by dividing it.
Evolution in government had made rapid strides in France from
the opening of the States General, May 5, 1789 until the acceptance of the constitution by the King, September 14, 1791.

Step

by step in the hierarchy of government, power had slipped downward and henceforth belonged by virtue of the Constitution of
1791 to the authorities who sat at· the bottom of the ladder.
Tbe constitution itself was not an impractical instrument; in
some respects it deserved and received universal approval.

If

it left much to be desired, it must be remembered that much was
demanded.

It abol ished feudalism partially, privilege almost

entirely, and absolutism altogether.

It created a kind of

social and political equality before the law, and it attempted
to create equality of opportunity, and to abolish arbitrary
arrest.

,

The majority of Frenchmen felt that the Revolution
would end when the Constitution was adopted, since it would re-

.,

move from France all the grievances of the ancien regime, and
give to France a modified form of monarchical government to
which the majority were sincerely attached.
89 .

The new constitu-

r
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tion organized the government of France upon the principle of
the separation of powers.

The King was reduced to the position

of an honorary president.

He would have in the future no con-

trol over the administrative departments which he must direct.
All means of control over the legislature were taken from him;
therefore, no harmony could exist between the executive and the
Assembly.

The legislative National Assembly now consisted of

only one chamber and its sessions were to be continual.

There

were thirty-four equal provinces out of which eighty-three departments were created.

Each department was again divided into

districts and each district into cantons.

Now representation

according to population was granted.
To give a new form of government to a kingdom which
had endured ,for many centuries was a gigantic undertaking, and
especially since there was scarcely an institution in France
which did not need to be renovated.

In France, moreover, re-

form had been so long delayed that when it came society collapsed.

The Constitution preserved some fragments of the old

system, but failed to harmonize them with the new.

According

to the treatment of the King rendered by the constitution, the
principle of monarchy must be absurd and immoral.

The King was

deprived of winning the confidence of the legislature for he
might not take its chiefs to be his ministers.

His veto on

91
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bills was merely suspensive; his part in foreign relations was

merely subordinate.

He was the ohief of an administration

whioh would not aot; and of an armed foroe whioh would not obey.
They thought a weak exeoutive was essential to freedom, and regarded the King as a disarmed enemy who must be kept impotent.,
The Constitutional Assembly consisted of sages, like
Mounier; th1nkers, like S1eyes; part1sans, like Barnave; statesmen, like Talleyrand; and men like Mirabeau.

Eaoh was inspired,

and felt himself urged on, without a king, without a leader,
without an army, without any other strength than their deep oonviction, to aooomplish his work--the plaoement of power whioh
for oenturies had been misplaoed.
workers beyond their intentions.

But the work oarried the
Government instead of being a

fUnotion beoame a possession; the K1ng, master instead of being
a ohief.
trate.

The 'people beoame a nation; the King a orowned magisThe nation in an assembly deolared its will, and the

hereditary and irrespons1ble K1ng exeouted it.

His offioe was

a oonoession to oustom, and he has been desoribed as a "majestio
inutility" in the Constitution.

A K1ng had been plaoed at the

summit of its institutions so that the kingdom would not be
oalled a republio.
\fuen Louis XVI aooepted the Constitution whioh weakened the royal power whioh he had reoeived from his ancestors,
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he was sincere and harbored no secret thought of a reaction
towards the past; but was distrustful toward the new institutions.

On September 30, 1791, President Thouret solemnly pro-

nounced these words before all his colleagues:

"The National

Assembly hereby declares that its mission is completed, and
that at this moment its sittings end."

The work it had pro-

duced--a ConstItution based on the separation of powers--was
thought to ensure the happiness of France.

But how shortsighted

was this far seeing prophetic nature of the Assembly!

•
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APPENDIX I
REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE CAHIERS
MADE BY M. CLERMONT-TONNERRE ON JULY 27, 1789 1

Deolared Prinoiples of the Cahiers
Artiole 1.

The Frenoh Government is monarohioal.

2.

The King's person is inviolable and saored.

3.

His orown is hereditary in the male line.

4.

The K1ng 1s the despository of the exeoutive power.

5.

Agents of authority are responsible.

6. The royal sanotion is neoessary for the promulgat10n of laws.
7.

The nation makes the law with the royal sanotion.

8.

National oonsent is neoessary for loans and taxes.

9. Taxes may be granted only from one meeting of the
States General to the next.
10. Property shall be saored.
11. Individual liberty shall' be .saored.

1

Andrews, 17

..
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APPENDIX II
REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE Cl\HIERS
MADE BY M. CLERMONT-TONNERRE ON JULY 27, 17892
Partial Agreement of the Cahiers
Artiole 1. Has the King legislative power limited by
the Constitutional laws of the kingdom?
2. May the King alone make provisional polioe and
administrative laws in the interval between the meeting
of the States General?
3. Shall these laws be submitted to the free registration of the sovereign oourts?
4. May the States General be dissolved only by themselves?
5. May the King alone oonvoke, prorogue, and dissolve
the States General?
6. In the oase of dissolution, 1s the King obliged to
summon a new convooation immediately?
7.

Shall the States General be permanent or periodic?

8. If they are periodic, shall there be an intermediary commission?
9. Shall the two upper orders be united in a single
ohamber?
10. Shall the two ohambers be formed without distinction of orders?

2

Andrews,

17-18
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11. Shall the members of the order of the olergy be
divided between the other two orders?
12. Shall the representations of the olergy, the
nobles and the oommons, be in the proportion of one,
two, and three?
13. Shall a third order be established under the name
of the order of the peasantry?
14. May persons having commissions, employment, or
places at the court be deputies to the States General?
15. Shall a two-thirds vote be necessary to pass a
resolution?
16. Shall taxes for the liquidation of the national
debt be collected until it is completely paid?
17.

Shall lettres de caohet be abolished or modtfied?

18. Shall liberty of the press be limited or
unlimited?
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APPENDIX III
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE
CITIZEN •
The representatives of the French people, constituted
as a National Assembly, considering that ignorance, forgetful~ess, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of
public misfortunes and the corruption of governments, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, inalien~ble, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration,
recall to them at all times their rights and duties; in order
that the acts of the legislative power and of the executive
power, being at each instant open to comparison with the aims of
all political institutions, may be more respected; and in order
that the demands of citizens, founded henceforth on simple and
~ncontestable principles, shall tend always to the maintenance
pf the constitution and the happiness of all.
Accordingly, the National Assembly accepts and
in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme
Being, the following rights of man and of the citizen:
~eclares,

~rticle

~ocial

I. Men are born and rema1n free and equal in rights.
distinctions can be founded only upon common utility.

~I.
The purpose of all political assooiation is the safeguarding
pf the natural and impresoriptible rights of man. These rights
~re liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

III.

The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in
individual, can exercise any authority
emanate from it.

~he nation.
No body, no
~hich does not expressly

IV. Liberty oonsists in freedom to do all that does not harm
others. Thus the exercise of the natural rights of man has no
~ther limits than those whioh assure other members of society
~he enjoyment of these same rights.
These limits can be deter~ined only by law.
~.
The
~armful

law has the right to forbid only those actions which are
to society_ All that is not forbidden by law cannot be
prevented; and no one oan be constrained to do what it does not
command.
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VI. The law 1s the expression of the general will. All oitizens
have the right to assist personally, or through their representatives, in its formation. It ought to be the same for all, .
whether it proteots or whether it punishes. All oitizens, being'
equal in its eyes, are equally admissible to all dignities,
plaoes, and publio positions aooording to their oapaoity, and
without other distinotions than those of their virtues and
talents.
VII. No man oan be aooused, arrested, or deta1ned exoept in
oases determined by the law, and aooording to the forms that it
bas presoribed. Those who solioit, expedite, or exeoute arbitrary orders, or have them exeouted, should be punished; but
every oitizen, summoned or seized by virtue of the law, ought to
obey instantly. He renders himself oulpable by resistanoe.
VIII. The law should estab11sh only those punishments whioh are
striotly and evidently neoessary; and no one oan be punished exoept by virtue of a law established and promulgated previous to
the offense and legally applied~
IX. AS every man is presumed innooent until he has been deolared
gUilty, when it is deemed indispensable to make an arr.est, all
severity not neoessary for making sure of the person should be
rigorously repressed by law.

x.

No one should be disturbed on aooount of his opinions, even
in regard to religion, provided their manifestation does not disturb the publio order established by law.

~l.

The free oommunioation of thought and opinion is one of the
most preoious rights of man. Every oitizen oan then speak,
write, and publish freely; but he shall be responsible for the
abuse of this liberty in oases determined by law.

XII. The guaranteeing of the rights of man and of the oitizen
neoessitates a publio foroe. This foroe, is then instituted for
the advantage of all, and not for the speoial use of those to
whom it is oonfided.
III. For the ma'intenanoe of the publio foroe and for the expenses of the administratIon, a oommon oontribution is indispensable. It ought to be equally distributed among all oitizens,
aooording to their means.
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XIV. All oit1zens have the right of verifying, themselves, or
through their representatives, the necessity of the public contribution, of consenting .to it without oompuls1on, of seeing how
it is employed, and of determining the quota, assessment, payment, and duration.

xv. Society has the right to demand from every public agent an
account of his administration.
XVI. A,soc1ety 1n wbicb a guarantee of rights is not assured,
nor the separation of powers set forth, has no oonstitution.
XVII. Property being a saored and inviolable right, no one oan
be deprived of it, except when public necessity, lawfully asoerta1ned, evidently demands it, and then only after previous and
just indemnity bas been rewarded.

,

•
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APPENDIX IV
EXCERPTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF 1?91
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, wishing to found the French
constitution upon the principles which it has just reoognized
and proclaimed, irrevooably abolishes the institutions harmful
to liberty and the equality of rights.
There is no longer any nobility, peerage, hereditary
dist1notions, distinotive orders, feudal regime, patrimonial
justices, any of the titles denominations, or prerogatives de- ,
rived from them, any order of knighthood, any organizations or
deoorations whioh require proofs of nobility, or which presuppose distinotions of birth, or any other superiority than that
of public offioials in the exeroise of their functions.
There is to be no longer any sale or inheritanoe of
publio offioes.
There is to be no longer, for any p'art of the nation
or for any individual, either privilege or exoeption under the
law oommon to all the French.
There are to be no longer any wardenships or corpora~ions of professions, arts, and trades.
The law does not henceforth reoognize any re.ligious
~ow or any other engagement whioh shall be in oonflict with
natural rights or with the oonst1tution.
CHAPrER I
OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

I. The National Assembly, forming the legislative body, is
permanent, and oonsists of one chamber only.
II. It shall be formed by new elections every two years. Eaoh
period of two years shall form one legislature.
Ill. The dispositions of the preceding articles shall not take
place with respect to the ensuing legislative body, whose powers
~hall cease the last day of APril, 1?93.
IV. The renewal of the legislative body shall be matter of full
tright.
V. The legislative body cannot be dissolved by the king.
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CHAPrER II
OF THE ROYALTY AND OF THE MlN IS'l'EHS
SECTION I
Of the Royalty and tbe King
I. Tbe royalty is indivisible, and delegated berea1tarl1y to
the race on the throne, from male to male, by order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants.
Nothing is prejudged respecting tbe effect of renunCiations,
in the race on the throne.
II. The person of the King is sacred and inViolable; his only
title is KING OF THE FRENCH.
III. There is no authority in France superior to that of the law.
~he king reigns only by it, and it is only in the name of the law
that be can require obedience.
IV. The King, on his accession to the throne, or at tbe period
of his majority, shall take to the nation, in·the presence of the
legislative body, the oatb TO BE FAlTHFUL TO THE NATION, AND TO
~HE LAW; TO EMPLOY ALL THE POWER DELEGATED TO HIM TO MAINTAIN THE
PONSTlTUTION DECREED BY THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE
~ARS 1789, 1790, and 1791, AND TO CAUSE THE LAWS TO BE EXECUTED.
If the legislative body shall not be assembled, the king
~hall cause a proclamation to be issued, in Which shall be expressed this oatb, and a promise to repeat it as soon as the legislative body shall assemble.
~II. If the king, having gone out of the kingdom, does not retur~
on the invitation of tbe legislative body, and witbin the delay
lPixed by tbe proolamation, which cannot be less than two months,
pe sball be deemed to bave abdioated.
,
The delay shall oommence from the day when the proclamation
of the legislative body shall have been published in the place
pf its sitting; and the ministers shall be obliged, under their
responsibility, to perform all the acts of the executive power,
~he exercise of which sball bave-been suspended in the bands of
tbe absent king.
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~ECTION

III

Of the Royal Family
V. The members of the royal family, oalled to the eventual
suooession to the throne, enjoy the rights of an aotive oit1zen,
but are not e11gible to any places, employs, or fUnotions 1n the
~om1nat1on of the people.
Exoept1ng the places of ministers, they are oapable of
off1oes and employs 1n the nominat1on of the king; however, they
cannot be oommanders-in-ohief of any army or fleet, nor fulfill
the funotions of ambassadors, without the oonsent of the legislative body, granted on the proposition of the k1ng.

SECTION IV
Of Ministers
1. To the king alone belongs the choioe and revooation of
ministers.
II. The members of the present National Assembly, and suooeeding
legislatures, the members of the tribunal of annulment, and those
~ho shall serve in the high jury, oannot be advanoed to the
~1nistry, nor reoeive any offioes, gifts, pensions, salaries, or~ommiss1ons from the exeout1ve power, or its agents, dur1ng the
cont1nuanoe of their funotions nor during the two years after
~aving finished the exeroise of them.
The same shall be the oase with respect to those who shall
~e only inscribed in the l1st of the high jury, during all the
~ime that their insc~ipt1on shall continue.

CHAPTER III
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE

L~ISLATIVE

POWER

SECTION I
Powers and Functions of the
National Legislative Assembly
1. The constitution delegates exolusively to the legislative
the powers and funotions folloWing:
1. To propose and decree laws: the king can only invite
the legislative body to take an ObJect into consideration.
2. To fix the public expenses.

~ody
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3. To establish the publio oontributions--to determine
their nature, quantity, duration, and mode of oolleotion.
4. To divide the direot oontribution among the departments of the kingdom--to superintend the employ of all the
publio revenue, and to demand an aooount of it.
II. War oannot be determined on but by a deoree of the legislative body, passed on tbe formal and neoessary proposition of
the king, and sanotioned by him.
In the oase of imminent or oommenoed hostilities, of an
ally to be supported, or of a right to be preserved by foroe of
arms, the king shall notify the same without delay to the legislative body, and shall deolare the reasons of it.
If the legislative body deoides that war ought not to be
made, the king shall immediately take measures to stop or prevent
all hostilities, the ministers being responsible for delays.
During the Whole oourse of the war, the legislative body
may require the king to negotiate peaoe, and the king is bound to
~ield to the requisition.
III. It belongs to the legislative body to ratify treaties of
peaoe, allianoe, and oommeroe; and no treaty shall have effeot
~ut by this ratifioation.
IV. The legislative body has the right of determining the plaoe
of its Sittings, of oontinuing them as long as it shall think
peoessary, and of adjourning; at the oommenoement of eaoh reign,
if it be not Sitting, it shall be bound to meet without delay.
It has the right of polioe in the plaoe of its sittin~s,
~nd to suoh extent around it as Shall be determined.
It has the right of disoipline over its members; but it
lOan pronounoe no heavier punishment than oensure, arrest for
~ight days, or imprisonment for three.
It has the right of disposing, for its safety, and the
respeot that is due to it, of the foroes whioh shall be plaoed,
~y its oonsent, in the oity where it sball hold its sittings.
V. The exeoutive power oannot maroh, or quarter, or station
~ny troops of the line within thirty thousand TOISES3 of the
legislative body, exoept on its requisition, or by its authority.
SECTION II
Holding of the Sittings, and Form of Deliberating
VII. The.legislative body oannot deliberate if the meeting does
not oonsist of at least two hundred members; and no deoree shall
3

About thirty-six miles
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be made except by the absolute majority of votes.
X. The king shall refuse his sanction to the decrees whose
preamble shall not attest the observanoe of the above forms; if
any of those deorees be sanctioned, the ministers shall neither
put to it the seal, nor promulgate it, and their responsibilIty
in this respect shall oontinue six years.
SECTION III
Of the Royal Sanotion
I. The decrees of the legislative body are presented to the
king, who may refuse his assent to them.
II. In the oase of a refusal of the royal assent, that refusal
is only suspensive.
When the two legislatures whioh shall follow that in which
~he decree was presented shall suocessively represent the same
~ecree in the same terms in which it was as originally conceived,
~he king shall be deemed to have given his sanction.
Ill. The assent of the king is expressed to each decree by the
Pollowing formula, signed by the king: THE KING CONSENTS AND
.ILL CAUSE TO BE EXECUTED.
The suspensive refusal is thus expressed: THE KING WILL
IEXAMINE.

IV. The king is bound to express his assent or refusal, to each
within two months after it shall have been presented.
V. No decree to which the king has refused his assent can be
presented to him by the same legislature.
VI. The decrees sanctioned by the king, and those presented to
pim by three successive legislatures, alone have the force of a
~aw, and bear the name and title of k\WS.

~ecree,

SECTION IV
Connection of the Legislative Body with the King
I. When the legislative body is definitively constituted, it
inform the king. The king may every
propose the objects, which, during
~ts continuance, he thinks ought to be taken into consideration:
~h1s form, however, 1s not to be considered as NECESSARY to the
~ctivity of the legislative bOdy.
~hall ~end a deputation to
~ear open the seSSion, and
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III. A week, at least, before the end of each session, •the legislative body shall send a deputation to the king, to announce to
him the day on which it proposes to terminate its sittings. The
king may come, in order to close the session.
IV. If the king find it of importance to the welfare of the
state that the session be continued, or that the adjournment be
put off, or take place only for a shorter time, he may send a
message to this effect, on which the legislative body is bound
to deliberate.
V. The king shall convoke the legislative body, during the
interval of its seSSion, at all times when the interest of the
state shall appear to him to require it, as well as in those
oases which the legislative body shall have foreseen and determined, previous to their adjournment.
VIII. The legislative body shall cease to be a deliberating body
~hile the king shall be present.
IX. The acts of correspondence of the king with the legislative
~ody shall be always countersigned by a minister.
CHAPTER IV
Of The Exercise of the Executive Power
1. The supreme executive power resides exclusively in the hands
of the king.
The king is the supreme head of the general administration
of the kingdom: the care of watching over the maintenance of
public order and tranquillity is entrusted to him.
The king is the supreme head of the land and sea forces.
To the king 1s delegated the oare of watching over the ex~erior security of the kingdom, and of maintaining its rights and
possessions.
II. The king names ambassadors, and the other agents of politi~al negotiations.
He names two-thirds of the rear-admirals, and one-half of
~he lieutenant-generals, camp-marshals, captains of ships, and
polonels of the national gendarmerie.
He superintends the ooinage of money, and appOints the
officers entrusted with this superintendence in the general
~ommission and the mints.
III. The king orders letters patent, brevets, commissions to be
delivered to all the public officers that ought to receive them.
IV. The king orders a list of pensions and gratifications to be
tnade out, for the purpose of being presented to the legis lative
pody each session, and decreed, if there is reason for it.

1
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SECTION I
Of the Promulgation of Laws
I. The executive power is charged with ordering the seal of
state to be put to laws, and causing them to be promulgated.
It 1s equally charged with oausing to be promulgated and
executed those acts of the legislative body which have no need
of the sanction of the king.
II. Two copies of each law shall be made, both signed by the
king, countersigned by the mi~ister of justice, and sealed with
the seal of state. The one shall be deposited in the archives
of the seal, and the other shall be sent to the archives of the
legislative body.

SECTION III
Of External Connections
1. The king alone can keep up foreign political connections,
negot1ations, make preparations of war proportional to
those of ne1ghboring states, distribute the land and sea forces
as he shall judge most suitable, and regulate their direction
in cas e' of war.
II. Every declaration of war shall be made in these terms:

~onduct

~Y

THE KING OF THE FRENCH IN THE NAME OF THE NATION.
CHAPTER V
Of the Judicial Power

1. The jud1cial power oan in no case be exercised either by
legislative body or the king.
II. Justice shall be gratuitously rendered by judges chosen for
a time by the people, and instituted by letters patent of the
king, who cannot refuse to grant them. They cannot be deposed,
but for forfeiture duly judged; nor suspended, but for an accusation admitted.
The public accuser shall be named by the people.
V. The right of the citizens to ,terminate definitively their
~isputed by way of arbitration shall receive no infringement from
~he acts of the legislative power.
VI. 'l'he ordinary courts of justice oannot receive any civil
~ction, until it be certified to them that the parties have
~ppeared, or that the pursuer has cited the opposite party to
~ppear before med1ators, to endeavor to bring about a reconcilia!tion.
~he
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VII. There shall be one or more judges of peace in the cantons
and in the towns. The number of them shall be determined by the
legislative power.
VIII. It belongs to the legislative power to regulate the number,
and extent of jurisdiction, of the tribunals., and the number of
judges of wbich each tribunal shall be composed.
IX. In criminal matters, no citizen can be tried but on an
acousation received by a jury, or decreed by the legislative
~ody, in the cases where it belongs to it to pursue the aceuea!tion.
After the admission of the aoousation, the fact shall be
~ecognized and deolared by a jury.
The jury whioh deolares the faot oannot be of fewer than
Itwelve members.
The applioation of the law shall be made by judges.
No man aoquitted by a lawful jury oan be retaken or aocused
on aooount of the same faot.
XI. Every man seized upon and oonduoted before an offioe of
polioe shall be examined immediately, or at latest in twenty-four
pours.
If it results from the examination that there be no ground
Por blame against him, he shall be direotly set at liberty; or
~f there be ground to send him to a house of arrest, he shall be
ponduoted there with the least delay possible, and that in any
pase oannot exoeed three days.
.
XII. No man arrested oan be detained if he give sufficient bail,
~n all oases wbere the law permits a man to remain free under
~a1l.

XIV. No guard or jailor oan receive or detain any man but in
a mandate, order of arrest, deoree of aoousation, or
mentioned in the tenth article above, nor witbout tran~cr1bing them t.o his own register.
XVII. No man sball be taken up or proseouted on aooount of the
writin~s which he has caused to be printed or published, whatever
~e their subjects, if he has not designedly provoked disobedience
to the law, outrage to the established powers, and resistanoe to
~heir acts, or any of the aotions deolared crimes or offenses by
the law.
The oensure of all the acts of the established powers is
permitted; but voluntary calumnies against the probity of public
offioers, and against the reotitude of their intentions in the
exeroise of their funotions, may be prosecuted by those who are
the subjeots of them.
Calumnies or injurious sayings against any kind of persons,
~elative to the aotions of their private life shall be punished
by prosecut i on.
XIX. There shall be, for the whole kingdom, a single tribunal
of annulment established near the legislative body.
~irtue of
~entenoe,

116
XXIV. The orders issued for executing the j~dgment of the• tribunals shall be conceived in these terms:
tiN. (the name of the king) by the graoe of God, and by the
constitutional law of the state, King of the French, to all present and to come, greeting. The tribunal of
has passed the
following judgment:"
T l'l'LE VII

Of The Revision of GonstitutioMl Decrees
II. When three successive legislatures sh~ll have declared an
uniform wish for the change of any constitutional article, the
revision demanded shall take place.
VII. The members of the assembly of revisi()n, after having pronounced together the oath TO LIVE FREE OR DlE, shall individually
swear TO CONFn~E THEMSELVES '1'0 DECIDING ON 1'HE OBJECTS WHICH SKAL
VE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THEM BY THE UNANIMOU8 WISH OF THREE PRECEDING LEGISLATURES; AND TO MAINTAIN, IN @trER RESPECTS, WITH ALL
HEIR POWER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM DECREED BY THE
ATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN THE YBARB 1789, 1790, and 1791:
AND TO BE IN ALL FAITHFUL TU THE NATION, TO THE LAW, AND TO THE
ING.

None of the powers instituted by the oonstitution have a
19ht to change it in its whole, or in its parts, excepting the
eforms which may be made in it by the mode of revision, conormably to the regulations of title VII, above.
The National Constituent Assembly commits the deposit of
it to the fidelity of the legislative body, of the king, and of
he judges, to the vigilance of fathers of families, to wives
nd to mothers, to the attachment of young oitizens, to the
ourage of all Frenchmen.

